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INTRODUCTION 
At the end of each college football and basketball season, 
coaches in the early years of multi-year term contracts (under 
which they agreed to perform exclusively for the school for the 
entire contract term) consider more lucrative offers from other 
schools that freely solicit them to fill their coaching vacancies, 
causing the coaches to break their existing contracts with their 
schools, and leaving vacancies for the jilted schools to fill in the 
same manner.1  This is known as the “college coaching carousel” 
in big-time intercollegiate athletics,2 and it has been causing 
coaches’ salaries to spiral out of control into the $2, $3 and $4 
million dollar ranges and climbing, which some critics have 
 
 1 See, e.g., Steve Wieberg & Jodi Upton, The Money Game, USA TODAY, Dec. 5, 
2007, at 1A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2007-12-04-
coaches-pay_N.htm [hereinafter Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game]. 
 2 See, e.g., CBSSports.com, 2007–08 College Football Coaching Carousel,  
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/story/10491600 (last visited Sept. 21, 2009). 
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characterized as “eye-popping, mind-boggling” and which “[s]ort 
of takes your breath away in this economic environment.”3  While 
the “have nots” continue to complain about cost containment and 
too much commercialization in intercollegiate athletics and the 
NCAA asserts it is powerless to do anything, the “haves” are the 
ones pushing the carousel because they generate the revenue to 
offset the huge financial liability created by buyouts and lucrative 
coaches’ salaries.4 
College coaches are not at-will employees; they promise to 
perform exclusively for the school for a period of years in 
exchange for an exorbitant guaranteed salary for the duration of 
that period.5  The problem is that these contracts are a one-way 
street from an enforcement standpoint.  The schools continue to 
reward coaches with contract extensions and salary raises after one 
winning season, and schools remain liable for the coach’s 
guaranteed salary for the remainder of the term when they 
terminate him without cause; the schools also, however, let 
coaches walk away at will and go work for, and be solicited by, 
their competitors with impunity.6  To be certain, this is not 
representative of free market competition, but rather unfair 
competition.  The purpose of this paper is not to criticize how 
much money coaches make, but to encourage our public academic 
institutions, which owe a moral and ethical duty to their student 
bodies, their student-athletes and society at large, to exercise fiscal 
responsibility and restraint by simply deterring their coaches from 
breaching their contractual obligations and their competitors from 
interfering with contractual relations.  This paper analyzes the 
economics of college coaches’ contracts and uses it as justification 
and support for universities to look closer at their legal options, 
rights and remedies. 
 
 3 Steve Wieberg, Brand: ‘Hard Questions’ Need to Be Asked About Rising Salaries, 
USA TODAY, Apr. 3, 2009,   http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/ 
2009-04-02-brand-salaries_N.htm [hereinafter Wieberg, Hard Questions] (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting University of Hartford President, Walt Harrison). 
 4 See id.; see also Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, supra note 1. 
 5 See, e.g., Martin J. Greenberg, College Coaching Contracts Revisited: A Practical 
Perspective, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 127, 134–35 (2001). 
 6 Id. at 135–36, 226. 
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Part I of this paper will address the economics of coaches’ 
contracts in big-time college football and men’s basketball.  It will 
discuss the contributing factors for the dramatic increase in 
coaches’ compensation in recent years, including the desire to win 
and the prospects of generating more revenue, the granting of 
contract extensions to keep winning coaches from being poached 
(with five specific examples of recent extensions), the payment of 
huge buyouts when coaches do not win, and the tremendous 
leverage that coaches have over schools in the hiring and contract 
negotiation process.  Part II will address the options and remedies 
schools have to deter coaches from jumping ship before the 
expiration of their contracts.  Specifically, this Part will examine 
the use and validity of liquidated damages clauses given the 
unquantifiable nature of the damages incurred by the school as a 
result of the loss of a head coach, and the difficulties of suing for 
damages in the absence of a liquidated damages clause.  It will also 
discuss the viability of the negative injunction to prevent a coach 
from working for another institution, including how college 
coaches meet the unique skills test for the requisite showing of 
irreparable harm and how a balancing of the harms to the parties, 
the public interest and the interest of student-athletes weighs 
heavily in favor of granting injunctive relief.  This paper concludes 
by addressing some practical considerations for schools in seeking 
injunctive relief, such as whether the existence or non-existence of 
a liquidated damages clause impacts the availability of injunctive 
relief, the likelihood of a quick settlement, and whether the school 
should be concerned about having to keep an “unhappy coach.” 
I.  THE ECONOMICS OF COLLEGE COACHES’ CONTRACTS 
In 2007, for the first time, the average earnings of the major-
college football coaches reached $1 million, which does not even 
include benefits, perks and performance bonuses.7  This included 
 
 7 See Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, supra note 1.  For summaries of the 
material terms contained in numerous college football and men’s basketball head 
coaches’ contracts, see Coastal Law Sports Law Coaching Contracts,   
http://www.fcsl.edu/node/174 (last visited Sept. 1, 2009).  “A coach’s base salary is . . . a 
small piece of his overall guaranteed compensation package” which typically includes 
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at least fifty coaches who made seven figures, which was seven 
more than in 2006, and at least twelve coaches who earned $2 
million or more, up from nine in 2006.8  By 2008, in college 
football there were twenty-three coaches who were making at least 
$2 million,9 which included one coach reportedly making in excess 
of $4 million10 and at least seven other coaches who had broken 
the $3 million mark.11  At the start of the 2009 football season, 
Notre Dame’s Charlie Weiss and Florida’s Urban Meyer became 
the second and third coaches to break the $4 million mark and at 
least sixty-nine coaches were making $1 million or more.12  Setting 
the market in college basketball by 2009 were Kentucky’s John 
 
“income guaranteed by their institutions from media and apparel deals, speaking fees and 
football camps.” Peter J. Schwartz, The Best (and Worst) College Football Coaches for 
the Buck, FORBES.COM, Aug. 13, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/08/13/football-
carroll-tressel-biz-sports-cz_pjs_0813coaches.html [hereinafter Schwartz, The Best (and 
Worst)]; see also Greenberg, supra note 5, at 134 (“The package might include shoe, 
apparel and equipment endorsements, television, radio and Internet shows, speaking 
engagements, personal or public appearances, and summer instructional camps.  In 
addition, the job may also mean such related perquisites as housing, insurance premiums, 
annuities, membership in health and country clubs, financial gifts from alumni and 
boosters, business opportunities, and the use of automobiles.”).  Throughout this paper, 
all references to dollar figures in compensation or salary shall mean a coach’s guaranteed 
compensation in the contract irrespective of how the compensation is characterized in the 
contract, i.e. base salary, endorsement compensation, guaranteed bonuses, etc., and do 
not include benefits, perks and performance bonuses. 
 8 Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, supra note 1. 
 9 Tom Dienhart, Calipari Deal Good News for Football Coaches, RIVALS.COM, Apr. 
13, 2009, http://collegefootball.rivals.com/content.asp?CID=934841. 
 10 Southern California’s Pete Carroll earns a reported $4.4 million a year.  See Tom 
Van Riper, The Highest-Paid Coaches, YAHOO! SPORTS, May 14, 2009, 
http://sports.yahoo.com/top/news?slug=ysforbescoachespay051409&prov=yhoo&type=l
gns. 
 11 These coaches include Florida’s Urban Meyer, Notre Dame’s Charlie Weiss, 
Alabama’s Nick Saban, LSU’s Les Miles, Ohio State’s Jim Tressel, Oklahoma’s Bob 
Stoops, and Iowa’s Kirk Ferentz. Id.  Tressel’s average annual salary was increased from 
$2.6 million to $3.5 million in late August, 2008. See Ken Gordon, New Salary for 
Tressel Ranks No. 1 in Big Ten, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 30, 2008, at 1A, available at 
http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/sports/stories/2008/08/30/tressel_contract.ART_A
RT_08-30-08_A1_4QB6A4A.html?sid=101. 
 12 See Ranking Salaries of Head Football Coaches in Football Bowl Subdivision, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 29, 2009, at C1, available at   
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/sports/college/orlsportseconchart30b073009jul30,0,6128
405.story; see also Robbie Andreu, UF Gives Meyer New 6-Year Contract, 
GAINESVILLESUN.COM, Aug. 3, 2009, http://www.gainesville.com/article/20090803/ 
ARTICLES/908039934/1109/SPORTS?Title=UF-gives-Meyer-new-6-year-contract. 
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Calipari earning $3.7 million,13 Florida’s Billy Donovan at $3.5 
million and Kansas’s Bill Self at $3 million.14  Other basketball 
coaches at the $2 million mark include Louisville’s Rick Pitino, 
North Carolina’s Roy Williams and Duke’s Mike Krzyzewski.15  
The “athletics arms race” in big-time collegiate athletics is 
certainly apparent when one compares these numbers to 1999, 
when only five coaches at major college football programs were 
making $1 million.16 
A. The Revenue Factor 
What is contributing to the dramatic increase in compensation 
of college football and basketball coaches?  One legal scholar 
opines that some of the factors that have contributed to the rise in 
salaries of college football coaches are (1) the proliferation of 
revenue generated from football bowl games and television 
contracts, (2) the substantial rise since the mid-1990s in agents 
representing coaches, and (3) increased competition for coaches 
fueled by the desire of National Football League (“NFL”) teams to 
hire college coaches and colleges to hire NFL coaches.17  
Similarly, Peter Schwartz of Forbes Magazine noted that, in 
football, “Escalating revenues from television, fat donations from 
boosters and bidding wars with rival schools (and in some cases 
the NFL) led to 56 coaches taking home $1 million or more in 
2007.”18 
The top revenue producers in collegiate athletics—Alabama, 
Florida, Kansas, Louisiana State and Notre Dame, among others—
are continuously willing to push the envelope on football and 
basketball coaches’ compensation for the prospect of having 
successful programs, which has led to the rapid escalation in 
salaries in recent years.19 Indeed, the revenues generated in big-
 
 13 See Wieberg, Hard Questions, supra note 3. 
 14 Dienhart, supra note 9. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, supra note 1. 
 17 MATTHEW J. MITTEN, TIMOTHY DAVIS, RODNEY K. SMITH & ROBERT C. BERRY, 
SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 370–71 (2d ed. 2009). 
 18 Schwartz, The Best (and Worst), supra note 7. 
 19 See supra notes 9, 13–15 and accompanying text. 
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time collegiate athletics in recent years can support the rising 
salaries.  In the 2007–08 school year, the top twenty revenue 
producers in college athletics each generated total revenue in 
excess of $75 million:20 
 
 
 20 Top Revenue Producers in College Athletics, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUS. J., June 
15, 2009, at 26, available at http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/62825 
[hereinafter Top Revenue Producers] (based on Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act 
documents filed by each school with the Department of Education). 
School 2007–08 Total Revenue 
1.  Texas  $120,288,370 
2.  Ohio State $117,953,712 
3.  Florida $106,030,895 
4.  Michigan   $99,027,105 
5.  Wisconsin $93,452,334 
6.  Penn State $91,570,233 
7.  Auburn $89,305,326 
8.  Alabama $88,869,810 
9.  Tennessee $88,719,798 
10.  Oklahoma State $88,554,438 
11.  Kansas  $86,009,257 
12.  Louisiana State $84,183,362 
13.  Georgia $84,020,180 
14.  Notre Dame $83,352,439 
15.  Iowa $81,148,310 
16.  Michigan State $77,738,746 
17.  Oklahoma $77,098,009 
18.  Stanford $76,661,466 
19.  Southern California $76,409,919 
20.  Nebraska $75,492,884 
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On an individual sport level, football by far generates the most 
revenue at the top revenue producing schools.21  The top ten 
revenue producers in football in the 2007–08 school year each 
generated between $52 and $73 million in revenue, reflecting a 
percentage of the school’s total revenue in the range of 55 and 
80%:22 
  
School 2007–08 Football 
Revenue 
Percentage of 
Total Revenue 
(rounded to the 
nearest tenth of 
one percent) 
1.  Texas $72,952,397 60.6% 
2.  Georgia $67,053,051 79.8% 
3.  Florida $66,124,945 62.4% 
4.  Ohio State $65,162,179 55.2% 
5.  Notre Dame $59,774,851 71.7% 
6.  Auburn $59,671,354 66.8% 
7.  Michigan $57,463,603 58.0% 
8.  Alabama $57,370,617 64.5% 
9.  Penn State $53,766,038 58.7% 
10. Louisiana State  $52,687,713 62.6% 
 
The revenue generated in basketball, however, paints a 
completely different picture and pales in comparison to the 
revenue generated in football.23  The top ten revenue producers in 
 
 21 See id. 
 22 Percentage of a school’s total revenue equals the revenue from a sport divided by the 
total revenue. See id. 
 23 According to Oklahoma Athletic Director Joe Castiglione, “Sheer numbers alone 
[ticket sales, donations related to benefits, premium seats and suites] would account for 
most of the difference [between football and basketball revenue].” Dienhart, supra note 9 
(alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
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basketball in the 2007–08 school year each generated between $14 
and $24 million in revenue:24 
 
   
As evidenced by the above data, all of the top ten revenue 
producers in football were among the top twenty in total revenue.25  
In contrast, of the top ten revenue producers in basketball, only 
two schools, Michigan State and Wisconsin, were among the top 
twenty in total revenue.26  However, the percentage of total 
revenue generated by the basketball programs at Michigan State 
and Wisconsin was only 20.4% and 16%, respectively.27 
If the salaries of football and basketball coaches are a reflection 
of the revenue generated by their respective sports, then the large 
disparity in revenue between the two sports leads one to question: 
whether perhaps football coaches are underpaid or, conversely, 
basketball coaches are overpaid.  To illustrate the point, the 2007 
 
 24 See Top Revenue Producers, supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 25 See id. 
 26 See id. 
 27 Percentage of total revenue that is Michigan State’s basketball revenue is 
$15,839,369/$77,738,746=20.4% and percentage for Wisconsin’s basketball revenue is 
$14,962,970/$93,452,334=16%. See id. 
School 2007–08 Basketball 
Revenue 
1. Louisville $23,519,846 
2. North Carolina $17,831,583 
3. Indiana $17,037,443 
4. Arizona $16,417,302 
5. Arkansas $16,099,373 
6. Syracuse $15,997,638 
7. Duke $15,903,075 
8. Michigan State $15,839,369 
9. Wisconsin $14,962,970 
10. Kentucky $14,867,027 
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salary of Florida football coach Urban Meyer was $3.25 million28 
and represented 4.9% of Florida’s football revenue generated in the 
2007–08 school year.29  Alabama’s Nick Saban and Notre Dame’s 
Charlie Weiss, who each earned roughly $4.0 million in 2007,30 
were paid salaries representing 7.0% and 6.7%, respectively, of 
their school’s football revenue generated in the 2007–08 school 
year.31  In basketball, the $2 million salaries of Louisville’s Rick 
Pitino, North Carolina’s Roy Williams and Duke’s Mike 
Krzyzewski32 represented approximately 8.5%, 11.2% and 12.6%, 
respectively, of their school’s basketball revenue generated in the 
2007–08 school year.33 
Thus, while the highest-paid football coaches are earning 
roughly 5% to 6% of their school’s football-related revenue, the 
highest-paid basketball coaches are earning more than twice that 
percentage of their school’s basketball-related revenue.  Indeed, 
comparing John Calipari’s $3.7 million salary, which he started 
earning when he signed with Kentucky in April of 2009,34 with 
Kentucky’s basketball revenue generated in the 2007–08 school 
year represents a whopping 25%.35  It remains to be seen what 
impact, if any, Calipari’s contract will have on football coaches’ 
contracts.  According to Rivals.com College Football Senior 
 
 28 See Donovan and Meyer: Highest-Paid Tandem?, ESPN.COM, June 8, 2007, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=2897946. 
 29 Percentage of Florida’s football revenue that is Urban Meyer’s salary is 
$3,250,000/$66,124,945=4.9%. See Top Revenue Producers, supra note 20 and 
accompanying text. 
 30 See Monte Burke, The Most Powerful Coach in Sports, FORBES.COM, Sept. 1, 2008, 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2008/0901/092.html; Jodi Upton, Saban’s Contract Could 
Bring Congressional Inquiry, USA TODAY, Jan. 3, 2007,     http://www.usatoday.com/ 
sports/college/football/sec/2007-01-03-saban-contract_x.htm. 
 31 Percentage of Alabama’s football revenue that is Nick Saban’s salary is 
$4,000,000/$57,370,617=7.0%; percentage of Notre Dame’s football revenue that is 
Charlie Weiss’s salary is $4,000,000/$59,774,851=6.7%. See Top Revenue Producers, 
supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 32 See Dienhart, supra note 9. 
 33 Percentage of Louisville’s basketball revenue that is Rick Pittino’s salary is 
$2,000,000/$23,519,846=8.5%; percentage of North Carolina’s basketball revenue that is 
Roy Williams’s salary is $2,000,000/$17,831,583=11.2%; percentage of Duke’s 
basketball revenue that is Mike Krzyzewski’s salary is $2,000,000/$15,903,075=12.6%. 
See Top Revenue Producers, supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 34 See Wieberg, Hard Questions, supra note 3. 
 35 See Top Revenue Producers, supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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Writer Tom Dienhart, Calipari’s deal will likely push the salaries 
of college football coaches even higher: 
Football is a much bigger revenue-producer on 
college campuses than basketball, so it stands to 
reason the football coach almost always will be 
higher paid. 
. . . . 
. . . And if a basketball coach now is being paid 
almost as much as the highest-paid football coach, it 
stands to reason football coaches will see their 
salaries rise.  In fact, college football may have a $5 
million–$6 million per year coach in the next few 
seasons.36 
B. The High Cost of a Highly Successful Coach 
“It’s a difficult line presidents, chancellors and athletic 
administrators have to walk.  You depend on the revenue of certain 
sports, and if you don’t have quality coaches who continue to bring 
in that revenue, especially if you have a highly successful coach 
who is in demand, you’re caught. 
If you lose that coach, will a school suffer a revenue drop?  
And if I don’t pay this coach and lose him, does it signify that a 
school isn’t committed to a program?  You could lose donations, 
ticket sales and television appearances, and that affects the other 
programs. 
 
 
 36 Dienhart, supra note 9.  It also remains to be seen what impact Calipari’s contract 
will have on the women’s basketball coaches market.  According to Bob Lattinville, an 
attorney who represents college coaches, “In the last 10 years, the increases in salaries 
have been exponential . . . .  They have, in some respects, tracked the men’s game.” Stu 
Durando, Fortunes Soar for Women’s Coaches, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 26, 
2009, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 2001, a study conducted by the 
Women’s Basketball Coaches Association showed that the average salary was $86,199, 
and by 2009, the average salary in the Big 12 conference was $548,000 and $345,000 in 
the Big Ten conference. Id.  The highest-paid women’s basketball coaches in 2009 were 
Connecticut’s Geno Auriemma, with a 5-year, $8 million contract, Tennessee’s Pat 
Summitt, with a $1.275 million salary, and Baylor’s Kim Mulkey and Texas’ Gail 
Goestenkors, with $1 million salaries. Id. 
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I think it’s a heck of a conundrum.”37 
– Big 12 Commissioner Dan Beebe 
The cost of hiring and keeping a successful coach can be 
substantial and may consist of (1) the coach’s guaranteed 
compensation package plus benefits and perks, as well as raises in 
guaranteed compensation following successful seasons pursuant to 
any contract extensions, (2) performance-based incentives for 
successful seasons throughout the term of the contract, (3) the 
payment of a buyout that is owed to a coach who is fired, and (4) a 
payment on behalf of a newly-hired coach for liquidated damages 
that is owed by the coach to his previous employer for breach of 
contract by failing to perform for the remainder of the term.38  As 
observed by two sports reporters: 
The marketplace shudders at the end of every 
season.  Coaches retire, resign and are fired, and 
schools eager to preserve or upgrade their programs 
chase the most attractive replacements.  Others try 
to keep their coaches from being poached.39 
1. Guaranteed Salary Raises: The Cost of Contract Extensions 
The proliferation of schools trying “to keep their coaches from 
being poached”40 in recent years has resulted in a flux of contract 
extensions that involve a consistent theme.  The team has a 
successful season and the coach, who has multiple years remaining 
under the term of his existing contract, is rewarded with a 
substantial raise in guaranteed compensation for another multi-year 
term (typically at least five years).41  Sometimes negotiations are 
contentious.42  However, a successful season provides the coach 
 
 37 Blair Kerkhoff, College Coaches Get Richer as Programs Try to Trim Other Costs, 
KAN. CITY STAR, June 1, 2009, http://www.kansascity.com/sports/story/1228663.html 
(quoting Big 12 Commissioner, Dan Beebe). 
 38 For an in-depth and comprehensive discussion, as well as specific examples, of the 
various guaranteed and non-guaranteed sources of income in college coaches’ contracts, 
see Greenberg, supra note 5, at 170–208. 
 39 Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, supra note 1. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See id. 
 42 See Tim Griffin, As Meeting Nears, ‘Stalemate Not Good,’ ESPN.COM, Feb. 19, 
2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=3918813&type=story. 
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with tremendous leverage and oftentimes there is minimal 
negotiation between the university and coach over compensation 
and term, which in and of itself creates a very unusual market 
dynamic involving a buyer and seller of services in an arm’s length 
transaction.43  Thus, a coach who has a successful season typically 
receives not only the incentive bonuses provided under his existing 
contract that were initially agreed upon in contemplation of future 
successful performance during the term of the contract, but the 
school also extends his contract providing the coach with 
additional guaranteed compensation for future years irrespective of 
performance in those years.  These dynamics are illustrated by 
recent contract extensions of coaches at Florida, Louisiana State, 
Kansas, Texas Tech and Cincinnati. 
a) Florida’s Billy Donovan and Urban Meyer 
In 2007, the University of Florida won both the football and 
basketball national championships simultaneously, a first in major-
college sports history.44  Billy Donovan coached the Florida 
basketball team to consecutive national championships, as his team 
also won the national championship in 2006, and Urban Meyer 
was only in his second season as head football coach at Florida 
when his team won the 2007 BCS National Championship.45  In 
June of 2007, Florida rewarded Donovan and Meyer each with a 
new six-year contract, making them the nation’s highest-paid 
basketball-football coaching tandem and together costing the 
university more than $40 million through 2013.46  At the time, it 
was reported that these two contract extensions made Donovan the 
highest-paid basketball coach and Meyer the second highest-paid 
football coach at a public school.47  When the extensions were 
announced, Florida Athletic Director Jeremy Foley said, “I 
 
 43 See infra text accompanying notes 59–60. 
 44 See Donovan and Meyer, supra note 28. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Under the contracts, Donovan is paid $3.5 million annually and Meyer is paid $3.25 
million annually. Id. 
 47 Id. 
C01_KARCHER_FINAL 12-30-09 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/30/2009  10:30:28 AM 
14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:1 
understand those numbers are significant . . . but it’s the market for 
having highly successful coaches.”48 
Foley’s comment prompts two pertinent questions.  First, what 
is the definition of a “highly successful coach” and, second, how is 
the market determined?  Florida assessed Donovan’s market value 
at $3.5 million per year when it signed him to a $21 million, six-
year contract and Meyer’s market value at $3.25 million when it 
signed him to a $19.5 million, six-year contract.49  At the time the 
contract extension was signed, Donovan achieved an overall win-
loss record of 261–103 in eleven seasons at Florida, which 
included nine NCAA tournament appearances, but his performance 
prior to winning the national championships in 2006 and 2007 
certainly would not justify making him the highest-paid college 
basketball coach in the country.50  Meyer, on the other hand, was 
only in his second year at Florida when his team won the national 
championship in 2007.51  The year before that, Meyer’s team had 
fourteen starting players return from the previous year (seven on 
offense and seven on defense) and the team finished with a 9–3 
record (5–3 in the conference), including a win at the Outback 
Bowl following the regular season.52  Florida made the 
determination that Donovan’s and Meyer’s performances justified 
giving them contract extensions that would make them the highest-
paid and second highest-paid public school coaches, respectively, 
and the highest-paid basketball-football coaching tandem in the 
nation.53 
In the first year of Donovan’s new six-year contract, which was 
the 2007–08 basketball season, the basketball team had an overall 
 
 48 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Foley’s announcement followed Donovan’s 
news conference Thursday during which he apologized to the Orlando Magic, his family 
and the [Florida] Gators for changing his mind . . . to opt out of the 5-year, $27.5 million 
contract signed [with the Magic] last week.” Id.  The day before the news conference, 
Donovan reached a deal with the Magic and opted out of that agreement. Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 See GatorZone.com, UF Football Schedule and Results, 2005 Season,  
http://www.gatorzone.com/sched.php?sport=footb&curyearb=2005&submita=1 (last  
visited Oct. 16, 2009). 
 53 See supra notes 44–51 and accompanying text. 
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win-loss record of 24–12 (8–8 in the conference) and did not even 
qualify for the NCAA tournament.54  Donovan’s team did not fare 
much better in the second year of his contract, as the team had an 
overall record of 25–11 (9–7 in the conference) and for the second 
straight year did not qualify for the NCAA tournament.55  Notably, 
for the second straight year Donovan’s six-year contract was not 
extended.56 
In the first year of Meyer’s new six-year contract, which was 
the 2007–08 football season, the football team finished with a 9–4 
record (5–3 in the conference), including a loss against the 
University of Michigan in a non-BCS bowl game, the Capital One 
Bowl.57  Meyer’s contract was not extended following that season.  
However, the next year Meyer’s team won the 2009 BCS National 
Championship Game, finishing with a 13–1 record (7–1 in the 
conference).58  A few months later on May 30, 2009, University of 
Florida President Bernie Machen announced that Meyer would 
receive a significant raise to his $3.25 million annual 
compensation.59  Although Meyer still had four years remaining on 
his six-year contract and Machen acknowledged that he does not 
know whether Meyer should be the nation’s highest-paid coach 
because he does not “know the market,” Machen proclaimed, “He 
 
 54 See GatorZone.com, UF Basketball Schedule and Results, 2007 Season,  
http://www.gatorzone.com/basketball/men/history/2007/review.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 
2009). 
 55 See GatorZone.com, UF Basketball Schedule and Results, 2008 Season,  
http://www.gatorzone.com/basketball/men/history/2008/review.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 
2009). 
 56 Author’s Note: Please note that news sources normally do not report non-extensions 
on long-term coaching contracts with multiple years remaining. 
 57 See Gator Zone.com, UF Football Schedule and Results, 2007 Season,  
http://www.gatorzone.com/sched.php?sport=footb&curyearb=2007&submita=1 (last    
visited Oct. 16, 2009). 
 58 See GatorZone.com, UF Football Schedule and Results, 2008 Season,  
http://www.gatorzone.com/sched.php?sport=footb&curyearb=2008&submita=1 (last   
visited Oct. 16, 2009). 
 59 Jeremy Fowler, UF President: Meyer Should Be SEC’s Top-Paid Coach, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, May 30, 2009, at C1, available at   http://blogs.orlandosentinel.com/sports_ 
college_uf/2009/05/uf-prez-hopes-urban-meyer-becomes-secs-highestpaid-coach.html 
(“Despite the negative public perception of spending money on athletics while academics 
suffer, Machen said Gator athletics will move forward without the fear of spending.”). 
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should be (the SEC’s highest) . . . .  He’s the best.”60  On August 3, 
2009, Florida announced that Meyer signed a new six-year contract 
that raises his salary by $750,000 and guarantees him $4 million 
annually.61  At the time of the announcement, Florida Athletic 
Director Jeremy Foley said, “Coach Meyer has certainly proven to 
be one of the top college football coaches in the country and 
should be compensated as such.”62 
Perhaps Florida’s definition of a highly successful coach is one 
that deserves a significant raise in guaranteed annual compensation 
for a period of years immediately following a successful season (or 
a national championship).63  And the market is determined by 
Florida.  One way to view a contract extension when the coach has 
a successful season during the term of an existing contract is that 
the coach is receiving a very large performance bonus in the form 
of higher multi-year guaranteed compensation that was not 
provided for in the existing contract, in addition to any incentive 
bonuses that the coach is entitled to receive under the existing 
contract based upon successful performance in any season during 
the term.64  In other words, it is almost as if the school is saying to 
the coach, “we originally agreed that you deserve to be paid an 
additional amount of $X if you win a national championship, but 
now that you won it, we think you deserve to be paid a lot more.” 
b) Louisiana State’s Les Miles 
Despite Bernie Machen’s desire to make Urban Meyer the 
highest-paid coach in the conference, it may not be possible 
because Louisiana State football coach Les Miles has an escalator 
clause in his contract that must keep him the conference’s top 
earner.65  The escalator clause in Miles’ contract is an interesting 
twist not only in terms of how the market is determined, but also 
from the standpoint that the coach continues to receive raises in 
 
 60 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 61 See Andreu, supra note 12. 
 62 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 63 See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. 
 64 “Meyer made $375,000 in bonuses last season for winning the BCS national and 
SEC titles and finishing in the top 10.” Andreu, supra note 12. 
 65 Fowler, supra note 59. 
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guaranteed compensation throughout the contract term regardless 
of performance, i.e. whether or not he is a “highly successful 
coach.”66  Conceivably, there can only be one highest-paid coach 
in the conference and as long as Miles’ contract with LSU contains 
the escalator clause, he must be the one.  However, it raises an 
interesting question, beyond the scope of this article, as to which 
school’s escalator clause would govern if another school in the 
conference included a similar clause in the contract with its coach. 
How the escalator clause in Miles’s contract came to fruition is 
especially noteworthy.  Less than one week after LSU landed a 
berth in the national championship game in January of 2008, and 
five days after Miles decided not to accept the vacant coaching 
position at Michigan, Miles and LSU entered a $12 million, four-
year contract extension.67  Miles had three salary escalators in his 
original contract that were also carried over to his new 
agreement—one required LSU to make him at least the 
Southeastern Conference’s (“SEC”) fifth-highest paid coach if the 
team wins ten games, another guaranteed he would be the SEC’s 
third-highest if the team wins a conference championship, and the 
third one guaranteed he would be “the nation’s third-highest paid 
coach if LSU wins the national title.”68  Within months, changes 
needed to be made to the new contract because LSU ended up 
winning the national championship game and the University could 
not verify the salaries of coaches at private universities, which are 
not required by law to disclose their salaries, such as Notre Dame’s 
Charlie Weiss and Southern California’s Pete Carroll, who are 
believed to be the highest paid in the nation.69  Therefore, Miles 
and LSU revamped that agreement and signed a five-year contract 
which guarantees that “he will be paid no less than the highest-paid 
coach at a public university in the conference, plus $1,000.”70 
 
 66 Id.  “If Meyer gets bumped to, say, $4 million per year from Florida, LSU might 
have to escalate Miles’ salary to $4.001 million—for five losses last season.” Id. 
 67 See Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, supra note 1. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See Brett Martel, LSU’s Miles Signs New Contract, USA TODAY, Mar. 14, 2008, 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2008-03-14-1205869527_x.htm; see  
also Ranking Salaries of Head Football Coaches, supra note 12. 
 70 Martel, supra note 69.  This agreement also guaranteed Miles $18.75 million if he is 
fired without cause, which increased the previously agreed upon $15 million without 
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What would compel LSU to agree to guarantee that Miles 
would be the highest-paid coach in the conference for the ensuing 
five years?  LSU Board of Supervisors Chairman-elect Jim Roy 
said, “It is what it is . . . .  It’s a performance-based contract.  The 
man won a national championship.”71  But to the contrary, Miles’s 
contract is not performance-based; the escalator clause applies 
each year and effectively guarantees Miles a raise in compensation 
during each of the remaining years of the term irrespective of the 
team’s performance in those years.  Another board member 
commented, “When you look at the silliness that’s going on in 
college athletics . . . it’s inevitable we’re looking at numbers that 
seem out of perspective.  But I think it’s the right number.”72  
Presumably, this board member is referring to the right number as 
the $3.751 million salary Miles earned the first year of the new 
five-year deal when the team won the national title,73 because the 
following year the team had a mediocre overall record of 8–5 (3–5 
in the SEC) and was unranked in all of the polls at the completion 
of the season.74  Former LSU Chancellor Sean O’Keefe said in 
regards to the adjusted cost to keep Miles, “If that’s what 
everybody considers reasonable, I congratulate him.”75  Notably, 
because of the escalator clause in Miles’s contract, what constitutes 
“reasonable” broke the $4 million mark beginning in 2009 with the 
announcement of Urban Meyer’s new contract that pays him $4 
million annually as well as Nick Saban’s contract at Alabama 
providing for annual salaries of $4.1 million in 2010, $4.15 million 
in 2011 and $4.2 million from 2012 to 2015.76 
 
cause termination clause. Jordan Blum, Miles Could Get $3.75 Million, 
2THEADVOCATE.COM, Mar. 15, 2008,   http://www.2theadvocate.com/sports/lsu/1669 
9056.html?showAll=y. 
 71 Blum, supra note 70 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73 See Martel, supra note 69 (“Miles will earn at least $3.75 million plus $1,000 a year 
in a deal that nudges him ahead of Alabama coach Nick Saban and makes Miles one of 
the nation’s top-paid college football coaches.”). 
 74 See Joey Johnston, Tigers Talented, but Have a Tough Road Ahead in Imposing SEC 
West, NBCSPORTS.COM, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/19945677/ns/sports-  
college_football/. 
 75 Blum, supra note 70 (internal quotations omitted). 
 76 See Adam Jones & Cecil Hurt, Saban’s Contract a Done Deal, TUSCALOOSA NEWS, 
June 15, 2007,   http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20070615/NEWS/706150345/ 
1007/APS. 
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c) Kansas’s Bill Self 
Within twenty-four hours after Kansas won the national 
basketball championship in 2008, head coach Bill Self was already 
discussing his contract situation—a contract that still had four 
years remaining.77  Following the game, Self told reporters that he 
would not rule out listening to an offer from Oklahoma State, a 
competitor of Kansas in the Big 12 conference: “That’s my alma 
mater . . . .  I know people down there.  But they haven’t contacted 
me.”78  Although Self signed a five-year contract extension the 
year before that increased his annual compensation to more than 
$1.3 million with a chance to make another $350,000 each year if 
he meets incentives,79 Self told ESPN that he still needed to talk to 
Kansas Athletic Director Lew Perkins about his contract: 
I want to visit with my athletic director . . . .  To be 
real honest with you, I love Kansas.  I love my job 
here, and hopefully it will be a situation where I can 
spend a long time here.  I’m certainly not looking to 
leave, but Lew and I got to visit.  I’m sure that’ll 
happen in the next couple days.80 
Four months later, it was announced that Kansas and Self 
entered a $30 million, ten-year contract extension.81  According to 
Perkins, the extension entailed minimal negotiation: “I wouldn’t 
even use the word ‘negotiate.’  The entire process was positive 
from day one.  We didn’t squabble over anything.”82  Self 
confirmed that: 
When we first sat down to talk, Lew asked me, 
“How many years do you want?”  I said 10 and he 
 
 77 See Posting of Thayer Evans to The Quad, The New York Times Sports Blog, Self 
Says He Wants to Stay, http://thequad.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/04/08/self-says-he-wants-
to-stay/ (Aug. 8, 2008, 18:17 EST). 
 78 Self Wants to Stay at Kansas but Won’t Rule Out Talking to Alma Mater, 
ESPN.COM, Apr. 8, 2008,     http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/ncaatourney08/news/story? 
id=3335488 [hereinafter Self Wants to Stay at Kansas]. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See Associated Press, Self Signs New 10-Year, $30 Million Contract with Kansas, 
USA TODAY, Aug. 7, 2008,    http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/ 
big12/2008-08-06-self-kansas_N.htm. 
 82 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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said, “Perfect, that’s what I had in mind. We’re 
going to take care of you” . . . . There was no 
negotiating on my part, either.  I can’t think of any 
place I’d rather work or live. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . But getting the security is definitely a nice 
thing.  Our coaches and I are very happy about the 
commitment the university has made to us.  We 
want to make a similar commitment back.83 
However, Self’s commitment seems questionable when he also 
told reporters, “But I’m looking at it as 10 one-year contracts.”84  
Perhaps Self remains committed to Kansas so long as he remains 
content with the level of guaranteed compensation each year. 
d)  Texas Tech’s Mike Leach 
In the 2008 football season, Texas Tech, under the leadership 
of head coach Mike Leach, matched the school single-season 
record for victories with an 11–2 record (7–1 in the conference), 
including a loss in the 2009 Cotton Bowl Classic.85  The team has 
been to nine bowl games during Leach’s nine-season tenure at 
Texas Tech.86  Leach had two years left on his existing contract 
and reports surfaced that Leach was apparently “willing to fulfill 
the terms of the remaining two seasons under his current contract,” 
but that Tech would not “go along with his desire because of the 
potential for recruiting damage with a lame-duck coach during that 
period.”87  Unlike the previous situations discussed, negotiations 
over an extension between Texas Tech and Leach got contentious 
regarding issues involving compensation and term: “what would 
happen if Leach were fired” or quit or “interviewed for a new job 
without the university’s permission,” and how money would be 
 
 83 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 84 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 85 See Brandon George, Leach Deal Gets Done Five-Year Agreement Reached After 
Long, Intense Negotiations, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 20, 2009, at C6,  available at 
http://www.wfaa.com/sharedcontent/dws/spt/wfaa/stories/022009dnspotechlede.2fa7bb1
3.html. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Griffin, supra note 42. 
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shared from “personal appearances and promotional activities.”88  
Leach and Texas Tech ultimately signed a new $12.7 million, five-
year contract.89  The Dallas Morning News compared the new 
contract with the previous one: 
 Leach’s new contract doesn’t have a buyout, 
making him the fifth Big 12 coach without one. 
Tech had wanted a $1.5 million buyout. His 
previous contract had a $500,000 buyout. 
 Leach’s new contract has a termination 
guarantee of $400,000 for each season left or 
about 16.5 percent of the entire deal. Tech had 
proposed $300,000 for each season left. Leach’s 
previous contract guaranteed him 40 percent left 
of his remaining deal if he were to be terminated 
without cause. 
 Both sides agreed that Leach has to give Tech 
“notification” if he were to interview for another 
job, but he won’t be required to get Tech 
Athletic Director Gerald Myers’ “permission” to 
do so, as Tech had proposed. Leach also can’t 
be penalized for interviewing elsewhere. 
 Leach gets to maintain his personal property 
rights, as he has in his previous contract, though 
Tech and Leach agreed to share marketing 
responsibilities for him . . . 
 Tech also guaranteed Leach $400,000 more 
annually to go toward his staff’s salary pool.90 
e) Cincinnati’s Brian Kelly 
In late 2006, the University of Cincinnati hired Brian Kelly 
away from Central Michigan to fill its football head coaching 
vacancy and guaranteed him about 62% more than it had paid its 
 
 88 Id.; see also George, supra note 85 (“After 10 months of fruitless talks that were 
sometimes heated, Leach and Tech finally agreed Thursday to a contract extension that 
will keep him in Lubbock through 2013.”). 
 89 See George, supra note 85. 
 90 Id. 
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previous coach, Mark Dantonio, who was hired away by Michigan 
State to fill its vacancy.91  The contract called for Kelly to make 
$800,000 in 2007, almost 4.5 times the $185,000 Kelly made with 
Central Michigan the previous year, and contained “built-in annual 
increases of $50,000.”92  In Kelly’s first season with Cincinnati in 
2007, the team finished with a 10–3 record (4–3 in the conference), 
including a win in the PapaJohns.com Bowl.93  After the 2007 
season, Kelly and Cincinnati agreed to a new five-year contract, 
which voided the remaining four years on Kelly’s initial contract 
and raised his guaranteed salary between $1.2 million and $1.35 
million and included performance-based incentives.94  In Kelly’s 
second season in 2008, the team finished with an 11–3 record (6–1 
in the conference) and won the Big East Conference title “sending 
them to the first BCS bowl in school history.”95  Once again, 
following the 2008 season, the two sides immediately began to 
discuss another extension that would add an additional year to the 
agreement and give Kelly another raise in guaranteed 
compensation.96  Cincinnati ultimately rewarded Kelly with a 
contract extension that gave him an additional year and raised his 
salary to $1.475 million, and included performance-based 
incentives and increases in the salaries of his assistant coaches as 
 
 91 Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, supra note 1. 
 92 Id. 
 93 See Joel Welser, 2008 Cincinnati Bearcats Football Preview, COLLEGESPORTS-
FANS.COM, http://www.collegesports-fans.com/football-previews/2008-ncaa- 
fbs/cincinnati-bearcats-preview.html. 
 94 See Associated Press, Kelly Agrees to Terms on New Contract with No. 20 
Cincinnati, USA TODAY, Dec. 17, 2007,  http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/ 
football/2007-12-17-757914779_x.htm. 
 95 Associated Press, Kelly Says He is Planning on Staying at Cincinnati, USA TODAY, 
Dec. 2, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/bigeast/2008-12-02-  
cincinnati-kelly_n.htm.  In response to a question about his plans on staying at 
Cincinnati, Kelly responded: 
All I can say is that with all the speculation and all the jobs that have 
been out there, sooner or later “no” means “no.” . . .  Again, no one 
can ever speak in terms of forever and ever, but what I can tell you is 
there’s been a lot of interest in my services, and I want to be here at 
the University of Cincinnati because of the right reasons. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 96 See Brian Bennett, Cincinnati, Kelly Close in on New Deal, ESPN.COM, June 2, 
2009, http://myespn.go.com/blogs/bigeast/0-5-4/Cincinnati--Kelly-close-in-on-new-  
deal.html. 
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well.97  Regarding this most recent extension, one reporter raised 
an excellent question: “It’s a fitting reward for Kelly.  The question 
is, however, if a big-name program comes calling on Kelly after 
this season, will the contract actually mean anything?”98 
2. Buyouts: The Cost of Replacing an Unsuccessful Coach 
When a new coach is hired to fill a vacancy, unless the former 
coach retired, the vacancy usually arises because the former coach 
either (a) voluntarily left for greener pastures to coach at a 
different school, or (b) was terminated.  Because college coaches 
are not at-will employees, a termination by the school “without 
cause” (for reason other than a breach or violation committed by 
the coach)99 entitles the coach to compensation, or damages, in 
accordance with the terms of the contract.100  Unfortunately for the 
school, when a coach is terminated for not winning, it constitutes a 
termination without cause.101  What is typically referred to in most 
industries as severance pay, the compensation paid to the former 
coach under these circumstances is commonly known in the 
 
 97 See Associated Press, Cincinnati Coach Kelly Gets Extension Through 2013, USA 
TODAY, June 22, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/bigeast/2009-
06-22-cincinati-kelly_N.htm. 
 98 Bennett, supra note 96. 
 99 Some of the typical termination “with cause” provisions in coaches’ contracts 
include the commission of a material breach by the coach, the commission of a felony or 
crime of moral turpitude, and serious or material violation of NCAA bylaws.  For a 
discussion of typical “with cause” termination provisions in college coaches’ contracts, 
see Greenberg, supra note 5, at 209–13. 
 100 “[W]hen the coach is terminated without cause, the issue centers on the 
determination of the amount of damages that the coach will receive, the nature of the 
damages, and the method of payment.” Id. at 226; see also Libby Sander & Paul Fain, 
Coaches’ Contracts Are Fertile Ground for Conflict, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., 
D.C.), June 12, 2009, at A1, available at  http://chronicle.com/article/coaches-contracts-
are-fertile/44424/ (“In most cases, if a university fires a coach with cause—that is, for a 
specific reason spelled out in the terms of a contract—it does not have to pay a dime. But 
terminating a coach for no reason often triggers payments, and those details are usually 
worked out in a contract.”). 
 101 See Greenberg, supra note 5, at 226 (“[T]ermination without cause is usually based 
upon the coach’s win-loss record, failure to beat a conference opponent, failure to obtain 
post-season invitations or appearances, attendance, lack of attendance, loss of favor with 
boosters, program elimination or financial exigency.”). 
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college coaching industry as a “buyout.”102  The amount of the 
buyout is typically tied to the number of years remaining on the 
term of the contract at the time the coach is terminated.103  Thus, 
the earlier in the term that a coach is terminated, the costlier it is 
for the school.  Buyouts are, in essence, an additional cost to 
schools for keeping coaches on contract that are no longer working 
for them.104 
Four recent terminations (or forced resignations) in college 
football during mid-season in 2008, and one at the end of the 2008 
season, demonstrate just how costly buyouts can be.  Washington 
terminated Tyrone Willingham in mid-season two days after the 
team fell to a record of 0–7.105  With one year remaining on his 
 
 102 Steve Wieberg, Huge Buyouts for College Coaches Causing Concern, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 6, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2008-11-06-coaches-  
buyouts_N.htm [hereinafter Wieberg, Huge Buyouts]. 
103 A number of options are available, including: 
1. A negotiated stated amount. 
2. The coach’s base salary or other compensation items for the 
remainder of the contract term. 
3. The percentage of the base salary and other compensation 
packages for the remainder of the agreement. 
4. De-escalating amount depending upon the year of the agreement 
and the termination therefor. 
5. A lump sum settlement. 
Greenberg, supra note 5, at 226 (citing Kevin Stangel, Comment, Protecting 
Universities’ Economic Interests: Holding Student-Athletes and Coaches Accountable for 
Willful Violations of NCAA Rules, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 137, 154 (2000)). 
 104 As noted by Dutch Baughman, who heads the Texas-based Division I-A Athletic 
Directors’ Association:  
Not only do you have these buyouts, these immediate expenses—
what it’s going to cost you to keep coaches on contract who are no 
longer actually working for you? . . .  You’ve got all the new 
(coaches’) contracts, all the moving expenses, all the other start-up 
costs of a whole new staff coming in. 
Wieberg, Huge Buyouts, supra note 102 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Iliana Limón, Part 4: Come on Down: College Football Coaches Still Lining Up for 
Rising Pay, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 29, 2009, at C1 (“The big salaries don’t stop when 
a coach is fired. Numerous schools are still paying coaches buyouts to coaches they’re 
now paying not to coach.”). 
 105 Willingham to Step Down as Huskies Coach at Season’s End, ESPN.COM, Oct. 28, 
2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=3667258.  Washington Athletic  
Director Scott Woodward said, “It became quite obvious with the performance on the 
football field it wasn’t up to what we talked about at the beginning of the season and 
previous to the season.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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contract at the time he left, Washington owed him a buyout of 
$1,000,000.106  Three football coaches—Clemson’s Tommy 
Bowden, Kansas State’s Ron Prince, and Tennessee’s Phillip 
Fulmer —were terminated mid-season during the first year of new 
contracts.107  Bowden stepped down after starting the first season 
of a new six year contract extension with a 3–3 record, and he was 
paid his salary through the end of the season in addition to a $3.5 
million buyout that was owed under the terms of his contract.108  
Kansas State’s decision to fire Prince was made mid-season after 
the team fell to a 4–5 record and a 52–21 loss to Kansas one week 
earlier.109  Prince was terminated in the first year of a five-year 
contract extension that was agreed to just prior to the 
commencement of the season.110  Prince coached the team for the 
remainder of the season and was owed “a $1.2 million buyout plus 
a prorated, $150,000 longevity bonus.”111  Fulmer was terminated 
during the first season of a seven-year contract extension in which 
he is owed a $6 million buyout payable over 48 months.112  
 
 106 Id.; see also Wieberg, Huge Buyouts, supra note 102. 
 107 See Wieberg, Huge Buyouts, supra note 102. 
 108 Associated Press, Clemson’s Bowden Steps Down, SI.COM, Oct. 13, 2008,   
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/football/ncaa/10/13/clemson.bowden.resigns/index.
html. 
 109 See Tim Griffin, Prince Won’t Return as Kansas State’s Football Coach in 2009, 
ESPN.COM, Nov. 6, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=3684640.  Kansas 
State Athletic Director Bob Krause indicated that the loss to Kansas contributed to the 
disappointment in Prince’s job performance:  “I think, in all honesty, that coming into the 
game, the buildup was there that there was a significant expectation that we would expect 
to win . . . .  That certainly is a factor.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 110 See Kansas State University, Prince Agrees to New Five-Year Contract, K-
STATESPORTS.COM, Aug. 7, 2008,  http://www.kstatesports.com/ViewArticle.dbml? 
SPSID=3065&SPID=212&DB_OEM_ID=400&ATCLID=1551188. 
 111 Wieberg, Huge Buyouts, supra note 102.  In the months following Prince’s 
termination, Kansas State officials discovered a “secret” deferred-compensation 
agreement, signed by the former athletic director months before Prince was fired, that 
would pay Prince $3.2 million and would be funneled to a limited-liability corporation 
formed by Prince. See Sander & Fain, supra note 100.  Kansas State filed a lawsuit 
challenging the validity of that agreement. Id. 
 112 Chris Low, Fulmer Agrees to Step Aside as Vols Coach at End of Season, 
ESPN.COM, Nov. 4, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=3679810; see also 
Wieberg, Huge Buyouts, supra note 102 (according to USA Today’s Steve Wieberg, in 
addition to the buyout owed Fulmer, Tennessee would pay “Fulmer’s assistants if they’re 
also let go: two years’ pay for coordinators and one year’s pay for the others[,]” totaling 
$1.935 million in salaries). 
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Finally, Auburn’s Tommy Tuberville resigned at the end of the 
2008 season in which the team finished with a 5–7 record, and 
Auburn agreed to pay him the $5.08 million buyout that was owed 
pursuant to the terms of his contract (that went through 2013) if he 
was fired.113  These five terminations in one football season left the 
five schools owing a combined $16.9 million to their former 
coaches in buyout obligations alone.114 
In April of 2009, the University of Kentucky hired John 
Calipari away from Memphis and signed him to an eight-year, 
$31.65 million contract, making him the highest-paid college 
basketball coach in the nation.115  Calipari filled a vacancy that was 
left following the dismissal of Billy Gillispie, who went 40–27 in 
two seasons at Kentucky and did not get Kentucky a seat in the 
NCAA tournament for the first time since 1991.116  Gillispie was 
working under a memorandum of understanding, which was signed 
when he was hired in 2007 and contemplated a seven-year term, 
because he had not signed a formal contract during the two years 
he coached at Kentucky.117  Gillispie and Kentucky both filed 
lawsuits over whether a buyout clause in the two-page 
memorandum, which would pay Gillispie $6 million, is binding.118  
If Gillispie prevails in his lawsuit, with Calipari’s salary, Kentucky 
 
 113 See Associated Press, Despite Tuberville Quitting, Auburn Will Pay Buyout, 
ESPN.COM, Dec. 11, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=3763601; see 
also Update: Auburn’s Tommy Tuberville Resigns, NBC13.COM, Dec. 3, 2008, 
http://www2.nbc13.com/vtm/sports/college/auburn/article/tommy_tuberville_resigns_as_
auburn_coach/49416/. 
 114 See supra notes 105–13 and accompanying text. 
 115 See Michael Smith, TV Money Arriving Just in Time for Kentucky, Calipari, STREET 
& SMITH’S SPORTSBUS. J., Apr. 6, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/ 
62131; see also Wieberg, Hard Questions, supra note 3. 
 116 See Associated Press, Gillispie Regrets Not Winning More, ESPN.COM, Mar. 31, 
2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=4023318. 
 117 See Associated Press, Kentucky, Gillispie Exchange Lawsuits Over Termination, 
USA TODAY, May 29, 2009,  http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/ 
sec/2009-05-28-kentucky-gillispie_N.htm?csp=34. 
 118 See id.  Kentucky’s lawsuit states, 
UK’s lawyers are asking the court to rule that the two-page 
memorandum of understanding Gillispie signed after his hiring in 
2007 was not the equivalent of a full contract.  Gillispie says it is and 
that he is entitled to $1.5 million a year for four of the five years left 
on the deal. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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will have paid in excess of $37 million over eight years for their 
new coach—a steep price to pay for a basketball program that 
generates approximately $15 million annually in revenue.119 
C. The University’s Return on Investment: Reward vs. Risk 
1. The Reward 
Schools justify the large financial commitments to their 
football and basketball head coaches on the basis that a coach’s 
compensation is an investment that yields a monetary return.  For 
example, when University of Florida President Bernie Machen told 
the Orlando Sentinel that Urban Meyer should be the highest-paid 
coach in the Southeastern Conference, he referred to Meyer’s 
compensation as an investment: 
Especially in a dynamic business like athletics, you 
invest a lot of resources and time in something . . . . 
It may not pay off for 3 or 4 or 5 years, but if you 
stop, then it’s just going to slow you down . . . .  I 
really believe No. 1, we’ve got the best athletics 
program in the country.120 
The expected return on that investment can take the form of 
increased ticket sales, marketing and sponsorship revenue, 
donations, and even admissions applications.121  Additionally, if 
there is a surplus in revenue, some athletic departments will help 
fund their school’s academic programs.122 
The expected high return on investment is evident in the recent 
hiring of two coaches towards the high-end of the pay scale in 
football and basketball, Alabama’s Nick Saban and Kentucky’s 
John Calipari.  In early 2007, Alabama hired Nick Saban away 
 
 119 See Top Revenue Producers, supra note 20. 
 120 Fowler, supra note 59 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 121 See Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, supra note 1 (“It’s an investment, school 
officials say, in the health of a sport that’s the revenue-generating backbone of most 
major-college athletics programs. Successful teams pump up ticket sales and prices, 
television rights fees, marketing revenue, donations and even applications for admission 
to the universities.”). 
 122 See infra text accompanying notes 152–55. 
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from the Miami Dolphins.123  Saban and his agent “negotiated an 
eight-year, $32 million contract that was, at the time, the highest 
salary ever paid to a college coach.  It remains among the highest” 
and is even larger than most NFL coaching salaries.124  Alabama 
President Robert Witt told the Board of Trustees, “We believe this 
contract serves the university well . . . . It represents a sound 
business decision.”125  The Chairman of the Board of Trustees said, 
“As a board, we feel we have made a wise and good 
investment.”126  Monte Burke of Forbes Magazine highlighted 
some of the areas of “return on investment” to Alabama as a result 
of the hire, from both an athletic and academic standpoint: 
 92,000 fans attended Saban’s first spring 
practice game.127 
 The waiting list for season tickets tripled 
following Saban’s arrival.128 
 The football program had an estimated $32 
million profit the year following Saban’s arrival, 
which was being used to pay off the athletic 
department’s $130 million debt incurred for 
capital improvements.  Alabama’s football 
program finances 77% of Alabama’s entire 
athletic department as well as some academic 
programs.129 
 With regard to the school’s recent $500 million 
capital campaign, Alabama’s president Robert 
Witt said, “We have had a 100,000 donors in 
that campaign, and a major reason they support 
us is football.”130 
 
 123 Burke, supra note 30. 
 124 Id.  Nick Saban’s contract with Alabama includes, “among other perks, 25 hours of 
private use of a university airplane, two cars and country club membership.” Id. 
 125 Jones & Hurt, supra note 76 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Burke, supra note 30. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
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 Regarding student enrollment, Witt said, 
“Having a coach of his caliber makes it easier to 
recruit better students and raise more money.”  
For example, enrollment of students in the top 
quarter of their high school class increased from 
54% in 2007 to 57% in 2008.131 
 Saban’s 2008 recruiting class was the consensus 
number one in the country.  Saban also had top-
rated recruiting classes in three of his five years 
as head coach at Louisiana State where he won 
two conference championships and a national 
title before taking the job with the Dolphins in 
2005.132 
Kentucky recently established a new high mark in basketball 
coaches’ compensation when it signed Calipari to an eight-year, 
$31.65 million contract.133  In the first year of the contract, he will 
make approximately $1 million more than the previous coach at 
Kentucky, Billy Gillispie, would have made that year had he not 
been fired.134  “Calipari is guaranteed $3.7 million [in the first 
year], then $3.8 million annually through the 2013–14 season and 
$3.25 million a year for the remainder of the agreement through 
2016–17.”135  It remains to be seen over the ensuing three or four 
years what kind of return Kentucky will ultimately receive on its 
investment in Calipari, but Kentucky has high expectations that the 
hiring of Calipari will generate more revenues.  In defending the 
contract, Kentucky Athletic Director Mitch Barnhart said, “If done 
correctly, the investment in a coach will pay for itself and yield 
returns for the overall program in general.”136  According to Tom 
 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id.; see also Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, supra note 1 (“At LSU, a football 
team that finished 11–2 and ranked No. 3 in 2006 accounted for 63% of the school’s 
athletics revenue for the year.  It also accounted for a lion’s share of the spending—more 
than $16 million—but turned an almost $32 million profit that helped underwrite the 
school’s non-moneymaking sports.”). 
 133 Smith, supra note 115; see also Wieberg, Hard Questions, supra note 3. 
 134 Smith, supra note 115. 
 135 Wieberg, Hard Questions, supra note 3. 
 136 Id. 
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Stultz, IMG College’s Senior Vice President and General 
Manager: 
A marketable head coach affects how people feel 
about the program. . . .  If the perception among the 
fans is that coach Calipari will return the program to 
national prominence, the value of that fan affinity in 
the eyes of sponsors goes up.  The fan base is more 
inclined to embrace the products and the sponsors 
that support the school. 
. . . . 
. . . You think about sponsors, donor contributions, 
the pressure on ticket sales, premium seating, 
merchandise sales.  It all goes up or down based on 
how the team is doing.  Paying a good coach will 
fund itself in extra revenues.137 
How are the large investments in Saban and Calipari funded?  
According to Alabama President Robert Witt, none of Saban’s 
compensation is funded by students or taxpayers but is paid 
entirely from athletic department revenue, which includes 
broadcasting fees, sponsorships, booster donations, ticket sales, 
and shoe and apparel endorsements.138  Calipari’s compensation is 
also supported by the athletic department budget.139  For example, 
Kentucky will pay Calipari with additional television revenue 
flowing from new contracts the conference entered into with CBS 
and ESPN that commence with the 2010 season and will pay the 
conference an average of $205 million annually, representing a 
projected revenue boost of approximately $5 million to each 
school in the conference.140  Kentucky will also receive additional 
revenues from an escalating marketing and media rights agreement 
it has with IMG College that guarantees Kentucky $7.8 million in 
2009 and $8 million in 2010.141  According to one source, 
 
 137 Smith, supra note 115 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 138 Burke, supra note 30. 
 139 See infra notes 140–41 and accompanying text. 
 140 Smith, supra note 115. 
 141 Id.  Kentucky is not the only school funding coaches’ salaries with additional 
revenue from new broadcast and marketing deals.  For example, Georgia will use part of 
the revenue generated from the new SEC television deal and its new 
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Kentucky’s basketball program “generates more than $20 million 
of [Kentucky’s] $70 million budget.”142 
Although most athletic departments operate under their 
university’s administrative umbrella, “Florida’s athletic 
department . . . operates as a separate nonprofit organization that 
funds itself.”143  Florida’s Athletic Director Jeremy Foley 
elaborated: 
It was set up as a private corporation, the underlying 
philosophy being money that could be used for 
academics would not be used for athletics. . . .  
That’s the way it always has been.  We receive no 
money from the university.  We generate our own 
dollars.144 
The athletic association is well-positioned financially, 
producing revenue in excess of $106 million before expenses of 
$98 million during the 2007–08 fiscal year.145  Like most major 
athletic programs, Florida’s primary revenue sources consist of 
booster contributions, ticket sales, licensing and marketing 
agreements, and broadcast deals.146  At Florida, winning has 
generated more revenue.  For example, Florida’s 2007 BCS 
National Championship Game “created windfalls from 
merchandise sales and booster donations.”147  Donations from 
 
marketing/multimedia deal with ISP Sports to help fund coaches’ salaries that increased 
from the previous year. See Tim Tucker, Georgia’s Athletics Budget in Good Shape, 
ATLANTA J. CONST., June 28, 2009, at 1C, available at  http://www.ajc.com/uga/content/ 
sports/uga/stories/2009/06/28/georgia_athletics_budget.html. 
 142 Smith, supra note 115. 
 143 Joey Johnston & Mick Elliot, Gators: Bank on Winning Ways, TAMPA TRIB., June 7, 
2009, at 1.  Florida’s rival, the University of Georgia, operates its athletics department in 
a similar manner with a self-supporting, separate fiscal entity apart from the university. 
See Tucker, supra note 141. 
 144 Johnston & Elliot, supra note 143 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id.  Florida athletics “receive[] a membership share of television-contract money 
paid to the Southeastern Conference, and [in 2008,] signed a 10-year, $100 million deal 
with Sun Sports and its partner, sports marketing company IMG,” which generates 
revenue for broadcast rights and advertising at athletic venues. Id.  Florida athletics will 
receive $25 million annually for fifteen years under the Sun Sports agreement and the 
SEC’s broadcast agreements with ESPN and CBS. Id. 
 147 Id. 
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boosters and other sources produced $3.6 million in the 2005–06 
fiscal year and jumped to $8.6 million the next year (an increase of 
138.9 %).148  In addition, Florida athletics experienced a $4.1 
million increase in merchandise sales and licensing income after 
winning the 2007 football title, which decreased by $2.4 million 
the following year.149  Florida’s $106 million in revenue for the 
2007–08 fiscal year was the third highest among all college athletic 
programs behind Texas and Ohio State.150 
New marketing and broadcast deals are generating more 
revenue for athletic departments, and as a result, more schools are 
seeing a surplus in revenue.151  Operating surpluses in athletics can 
help fund academics.  For example, according to The Tampa 
Tribune, since 1990, Florida’s athletic association has made annual 
contributions to the university totaling in excess of $48 million, 
including a contribution in excess of $9.5 million in 2007.152  
Oklahoma’s athletic department makes annual contributions of at 
least $1 million to the university’s academic programs, and in 
2009, it increased financial assistance by $3 million to help the 
university avoid tuition increases for students and layoffs of 
faculty and staff.153  The athletic departments at Arkansas and 
South Carolina recently made million-dollar contributions to their 
schools’ academic programs in 2009 as well.154  Additionally, as a 
 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 See Top Revenue Producers, supra note 20. 
 151 See supra notes 141 and 146; see also Seth Emerson, USC Funds Up Even as 
Football Ticket Sales Dip, STATE, June 12, 2009, available at  http://www.thestate.com/ 
gogamecocks/story/823288.html (noting that South Carolina’s athletics department is 
projecting a $1 million increase in its surplus for the 2009–10 fiscal year, despite an 
anticipated drop in football season-ticket sales and club memberships, in large part due to 
the SEC’s new 15-year television deal with ESPN); Tucker, supra note 141 (“Georgia 
expects an increase of about $8.5 million in athletics revenue, almost $7 million of it 
from the SEC’s new TV deal and UGA’s new marketing and multimedia deal.”); 
Michigan Athletic Department FY 2010 (June 18, 2009), http://annarborchronicle.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2009/06/fy-2010-athletic-budget-presentaiton.pdf (projecting that 
Michigan’s athletic department, in its ninth straight year of operating surpluses, will have 
a $9 million surplus for fiscal year 2010). 
 152 See Johnston & Elliot, supra note 143. 
 153 Tim Griffin, Sooner Athletics Gives an Additional $3 Million, ESPN.COM, June 24, 
2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=4284416. 
 154 Id. 
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result of a reduction in state funding at the University of Georgia, 
its athletic department will contribute $2 million each of the next 
three years to support academic programs.155 
2. The Risk 
Focusing on the potential reward from making such a large 
investment in a coach may convince one to conclude that a highly-
compensated coach is more likely to result in a successful 
program, which will lead to a surplus in revenue.156  But as is the 
case with any investment, risk follows potential reward.  In big-
time intercollegiate athletics, the risk to a school making a 
significant investment in a coach is that the investment does not 
result in a successful program.  A few recent studies have shown 
that there is a tenuous connection between coaches’ salaries and 
winning. 
A report released in 2009, based upon a study commissioned 
by the NCAA that evaluated overall athletic department spending 
and win-loss records over the three-year period from 2004–07, 
revealed that there is a significant relationship between winning 
 
 155 Tucker, supra note 141. 
 156 See supra text accompanying note 137; see also Mary Morgan, UM FY10 = Tuition 
Hike + Financial Aid, ANN ARBOR CHRON.,  http://annarborchronicle.com/2009/06/21/ 
um-fy10-tuition-hike-financial-aid/ (“UM is one of only a handful of universities with a 
self-sustaining athletic department.”).  But see Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, 
supra note 1 (“Not all athletics departments are self-supporting, however. The NCAA’s 
latest data shows that more than four of every five major-college sports programs need 
institutional subsidies, student fees and other supplements to balance their budgets.”); 
Mark Alesia, Colleges Play, Public Pays, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 30, 2006, at A1, 
available at  http://www.indystar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/99999999/SPORTS06/ 
399990029/1216/LOCAL08 (“Athletic departments at taxpayer-funded universities 
nationwide receive more than $1 billion in student fees and general school funds and 
services, according to an Indianapolis Star analysis of the 2004–05 athletic budgets of 
164 of the nation’s 215 largest public schools.  Without such outside funding, fewer than 
10 percent of athletic departments would have been able to support themselves with 
ticket sales, television contracts and other revenue-generating sports sources.”); Steve 
Wieberg & Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Report:  College Sports Spending Keeps 
Skyrocketing, USA TODAY, Apr. 30, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/ 
college/2009-04-29-college-athletic-spending-report_N.htm [hereinafter Wieberg & 
Berkowitz, NCAA Report] (“All but about two dozen of the 120 athletics programs in the 
Bowl Subdivision are subsidized to some degree by their respective schools.”). 
C01_KARCHER_FINAL 12-30-09 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/30/2009  10:30:28 AM 
34 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:1 
and total program expenditures.157  For example, the study 
estimates that “[a]n extra $1 million spent on football increases 
winning percentage by 1.8 percentage points and the chances of a 
top 25 finish in the Associated Press media poll by 5 percentage 
points,” which results in extra revenue of approximately $3 million 
(not including revenue generated from bowl game appearances).158  
However, the authors of the report noted that team expenditures, 
such as recruiting, equipment and other “game-day expenses” are 
the only category of spending with a statistically significant effect 
on performance.159  According to “[c]o-author Jonathan Orszag, an 
economist who once served on President Clinton’s National 
Economic Council and as assistant to the Secretary of Commerce,” 
although there are exceptions, in the aggregate, “big salaries for 
coaches [do not] prove to be sound investments.”160 
Forbes Magazine completed a study in 2008 comparing the 
highest-paid football coaches with their win-loss records using a 
metric that compared a coach’s 2007 salary with his team’s 
performance over the previous three-year period covering the 
2005, 2006 and 2007 seasons, with bonus points given for winning 
any of the five prestigious BCS bowl games.161  The study was 
limited to coaches from schools in the six major conferences,162 
which “accounted for 87% of total college football revenue, as 
 
 157 See Wieberg & Berkowitz, NCAA Report, supra note 156. 
 158 Id.  In basketball, the study similarly concluded that there was a distinct correlation 
between non-salary expenditures and both winning percentage and the probability of 
reaching the NCAA tournament. Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. (“There’s a lot of pressure on university presidents to hire an expensive coach, . . 
. but the evidence suggests that spending more on coaches does not bring the benefit to 
the university that they expect.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jonathan 
Orszag)). 
 161 See Schwartz, The Best (and Worst), supra note 7.   In addition to base pay, salary 
figures used in the study included: (1) income guaranteed from media and apparel deals, 
speaking fees and football camps; (2) performance bonuses received during the 2007 
season for bowl game appearances and high national rankings; and (3) expense accounts 
and estimated value of perks such as use of cars and private airplanes, golf club 
memberships, etc. Id. 
 162 Atlantic Coast Conference, Big East Conference, Big Ten Conference, Big 12 
Conference, Pac 10 Conference and Southeastern Conference. CBSSports.com, 
Comparing Major Conferences’ OOC Schedules,  http://www.cbssports.com/mcc/ 
messages/chrono/15354081 (last visited Oct. 17, 2009). 
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well as independent . . . Notre Dame.”163  According to Forbes 
Magazine, the five most underpaid coaches with successful 
football programs were as follows: 
 Ohio State’s Jim Tressel, whose $2.6 million 
salary was less than eight other coaches despite 
a 33–5 record (1–2 in BCS bowl games),164 
including appearances in the 2007 and 2008 
BCS National Championship Games;165 
 Oregon State’s Mike Riley, who had a 24–14 
record (2–0 in bowl games) and earned $1.1 
million;166 
 Wake Forest’s Jim Grobe, who also had a 24–14 
record (2–0 in bowl games; 0–1 in BCS bowl 
games) and signed an extension for a relatively 
low $1.2 million after he took the team to its 
first BCS Orange Bowl Game;167 
 Southern California’s Pete Carroll, whose 34–5 
record (2–1 in BCS bowl games) made him the 
highest paid at $4.4 million;168 and 
 Virginia Tech’s Frank Beamer, who had a 32–8 
record (1–2 in bowl games; 0–1 in BCS bowl 
games) and earned $2.1 million.169 
Interestingly, just two weeks after Forbes Magazine published 
this list, Ohio State announced that Tressel’s annual salary would 
be immediately raised from an average of $2.6 million to an 
average of $3.5 million, which automatically made him the highest 
 
 163 Schwartz, The Best (and Worst), supra note 7. 
 164 Peter J. Schwartz, In Pictures: The Best (and Worst) College Football Coaches for 
the Buck, FORBES.COM, Aug. 13, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/08/13/football-
carroll-tressel-biz-sports-cz_pjs_0813coaches_slide.html [hereinafter Schwartz, In  
Pictures]. 
 165 See ESPN.com, Flynn Leads LSU With 4 TDs As Tigers Extend Buckeyes’ SEC 
Troubles, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/recap?gameId=280070194 (last visited Oct. 17, 
2009). 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
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paid football coach in the Big Ten conference.170  According to 
Ohio State Athletic Director Gene Smith, Tressel “was not the No. 
1 (paid) coach in the conference.  The big thing for me was, ‘How 
can we sit here and not be fair to him?’  We have the No. 1 coach 
in the conference, period.  Why wouldn’t we recognize that?”171 
Even more indicative of the tenuous relationship that exists 
between winning and high coaching salaries is Forbes Magazine’s 
list of the five most overpaid coaches with unsuccessful football 
programs: 
 Iowa’s Kirk Ferentz, who had a $3.4 million 
salary with a 19–18 record (1–2 in bowl 
games);172 
 Syracuse’s Greg Robinson, who had a 7–28 
record with a $1.1 million salary;173 
 Notre Dame’s Charlie Weis, who had a 22–15 
record (0–2 in BCS bowl games), and his 3-win 
season in 2007 was the second year of a 10-year 
contract extension reportedly worth between 
$30 and $40 million;174 
 Maryland’s Ralph Friedgen, who earned $1.8 
million with a 20–17 record (1–1 in bowl 
games) and a win percentage that dropped by 
 
 170 Gordon, supra note 11. 
 171 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Ohio State University President E. Gordon 
Gee emphasized: 
I honestly think Jim Tressel is so committed to our program that we 
could not raise his salary, not extend his contract, and he’d stay and 
be loyal. . . .  But that’s all the more reason to recognize someone.  
You don’t take advantage of someone; you take advantage of what 
you have because of him. 
 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 172 Schwartz, In Pictures, supra note 164.  In July of 2009, Ferentz signed a seven-year 
contract extension with the Hawkeyes through the 2015 football season. Associated 
Press, Kirk Ferentz Signs New Seven-Year Deal at Iowa, USA TODAY, July 20, 2009, 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/bigten/2009-07-20-iowa-ferentz-
contract_N.htm. 
 173 Schwartz, In Pictures, supra note 164. 
 174 Id. 
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35% since signing a new contract in 2004;175 
and 
 Virginia’s Al Groh, who had a 21–16 record (1–
1 in bowl games) with a $2 million salary.176 
The top three most overpaid coaches on Forbes Magazine’s 
list—Ferentz, Robinson and Weis—are also coaches at schools 
that are listed among the top ten schools that paid the most coach’s 
salary per win during the 2007 football season:177 
 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id.; Rank That Coach!, Dollars Per Win, http://rankthatcoach.com/blog/dollars-per-
win/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2009). 
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Coach School Salary Wins  $ Per Win  
1.Charlie 
Weiss 
Notre 
Dame 
$3,500,000 3  $1,166,666.67 
2.Tim 
Brewster 
Minnesota $1,000,000 1  $1,000,000.00 
3.Nick 
Saban 
Alabama $3,500,000 6  $583,333.33 
4.Greg 
Robinson 
Syracuse $1,000,000 2  $500,000.00 
5.Phil 
Bennett 
SMU $495,602 1 $495,602.00 
6.Kirk 
Ferentz 
Iowa $2,840,000 6  $473,333.33 
7.Butch 
Davis 
North 
Carolina 
$1,800,000 4  $450,000.00 
8.Guy 
Morriss 
Baylor $1,144,236 3  $381,412.00 
9.Ted Roof Duke $370,200 1  $370,200.00 
10.Gene 
Chizik 
Iowa State $1,100,000 3  $366,666.67 
 
Perhaps the real impetus for the rise in coaching salaries in big-
time intercollegiate athletics may be attributed to the desire to win 
and a perception among college administrators that only a small 
handful of coaches in the marketplace are capable of doing that.  
Whether that perception is accurate is irrelevant because, as the old 
adage goes, “perception is reality.”  In basic economic terminology 
it equates to limited supply and high demand, which causes an 
increase in price.  However, the above data indicates that winning 
is not a reflection of a coach’s salary.  Nevertheless, in an effort to 
do whatever it takes to succeed, schools that generate the revenue 
to support large coaching salaries will continue to chase the carrot 
by luring coaches from their competitors with even greater 
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compensation, thus creating a unique leverage dynamic between 
college football and basketball coaches’ contracts.  In regards to 
this leverage dynamic, one commentator noted that “[b]y 
definition, each coach’s compensation level is ‘the market.’  
Therefore, if any contract pushes the envelope, it immediately 
establishes a new grid for negotiation.”178 
D. The Leverage of Highly Successful Coaches 
Successful college coaches have tremendous leverage in the 
hiring and contract negotiation process.  While revenue generation 
and the desire to win discussed in the previous sections may, in 
part, provide an explanation for why that leverage exists, they 
certainly do not tell the complete story.  This Section will address 
the various factors (in no particular order of priority) contributing 
to the leverage of successful college coaches, including why they 
have greater leverage than even coaches in the professional ranks. 
1. Timing Pressures, Agents and the Media 
“What I think happens is the fact that, gee, we lost our 
coach . . . and so we’ve got to get someone the next day, and so we 
panic.”179 
—Ohio State President, E. Gordon Gee 
A small window of opportunity exists during the peak hiring 
seasons in football and men’s basketball in which athletic directors 
with coaching vacancies scramble to hire their first choice for the 
job.  The peak hiring season in football is from the end of the 
season in late December to early January, and for men’s basketball, 
it is the end of the season in late March to early April.180  Timing is 
everything, and “[a]n athletic director who can’t make an offer 
right away can lose his top prospect in an instant.”181  Some 
commentators say this pace makes many athletic department 
 
 178 Dienhart, supra note 9 (“[C]ollege football may have a $5 million–$6 million per 
year coach in the next few seasons.”). 
 179 Sander & Fain, supra note 100 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ohio 
State President, E. Gordon Gee). 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
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administrators nervous and, in the words of Ohio State University 
President Gordon Gee, leads to “panic.”182  According to Raymond 
D. Cotton, a Washington-based lawyer who specializes in 
presidents’ compensation, “The panic leads to overpaying and lack 
of adequate negotiations,” and “leaves the university exposed.”183  
Moreover, he says it is a “ludicrous” process and one that is not 
appropriate for higher education.184 
The pressure to quickly get a coach signed for fear of losing 
him to a competitor school if a deal does not get done gives the 
coach an advantage over the school in the negotiation process.  As 
is the case in any negotiation, unless the school is willing to walk 
away from the deal, the school is likely to accede to the coach’s 
demands.  Moreover, in an effort to lock up the coach before the 
media gets hold of it and announces the hiring, the school quickly 
hammers out a short memorandum of understanding that outlines 
the material terms, such as length of term, compensation and 
buyout amounts, in contemplation that a detailed employment 
agreement will soon be negotiated and signed in the ensuing 
months.185  As a result of this pressure, the school is “caught 
between a rock and a hard place” in at least two respects.  First, 
today’s 24-hour news cycle makes it very difficult for schools to 
keep their search process confidential, and once it is reported that 
the school and coach are having discussions, the school would be 
hard-pressed to explain that it passed on its first choice because an 
agreement could not be reached with the coach on the material 
terms of employment.  Arizona Athletic Director Jim Livengood, 
who swiftly hired a new basketball coach recently, is “well aware 
that athletic directors and university lawyers need to have the 
tough conversations early on, even at the risk of throwing a wet 
blanket on the hopeful tone of a new coaching regime.”186  Second, 
once the coach has signed a memorandum of understanding and 
begins working, the coach tends to have more leverage in 
negotiating the employment agreement because, although the 
 
 182 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 183 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 184 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 185 See id. 
 186 Id. 
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memorandum locks in both the school and the coach, from a 
practical standpoint, the school is not going to allow the outcome 
to be dictated by a dispute over terms to be included in an 
employment agreement.187 
The expansion of the coaching marketplace expands the role of 
agents working on behalf of coaches, who can chart the coach’s 
career and seek out potential opportunities and offers.188  The 
proliferation of coaches’ agents in recent years has clearly had an 
impact on the demands of coaches during the hiring process, which 
has contributed to the rise in salaries.189  Agents are well-prepared 
and are well aware of the salaries of other coaches.190  By virtue of 
the fact that a relatively small number of agents represent the high 
profile coaches, an agent can easily justify to an athletic director 
what the market should pay.191  Most agents operate on a 
commission basis,192 giving agents an incentive to drive up salaries 
even more.  Thus, an agent who negotiates a $3,000,000 annual 
salary for a coach receives $90,000 to $120,000 in commission, 
annually, for the life of that contract.  Libby Sander and Paul Fain 
of The Chronicle of Higher Education noted that, “As coaches 
 
 187 But see, e.g., UK Athletics Files Suit in Response to Gillispie, SPORTS NETWORK, 
May 20, 2009,   http://www.sportsnetwork.com/merge/tsnform.aspx?c=sportsnetwork 
&page=cbask/news/newstest.aspx?id=4234270 (“Until the firing, neither side could agree 
to an actual contract due to disputes over deferred compensation and how to define 
‘termination without cause.’”). 
 188 Robert H. Lattinville & Robert A. Boland, Coaching in the National Football 
League: A Market Survey and Legal Review, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 109, 121 (2006). 
 189 See Brian Curtis, The Kingmakers: Part II: Agents Playing an Ever Greater Role in 
the Hiring of College Coaches, CSTV.COM, Jan. 30, 2008,  
http://www.cstv.com/sports/m-footbl/stories/013008aag.html [hereinafter Curtis, The 
Kingmakers: Part II].  As noted by one prominent agent, Jimmy Sexton, “Agents are 
relatively new, especially in sports, [and] coaching agents are an even more recent 
change, just in the last five to 10 years.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 190 Id. (“One clear success in recent years for coaching representatives has been the 
driving up of salaries. . . .  And they will tell you that one of the reasons for their 
successes in negotiations is that they come prepared.  They know what the market should 
pay and they know what other coaches are making.”). 
 191 Id.  Agents also keep abreast of the market via the Freedom of Information Act, 
which requires public universities to make copies of their coaches’ contracts available to 
the public upon request. Id. 
 192 See, e.g., id. 
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demand bigger compensation deals, one question looms: Are 
university lawyers outmatched?”193  Sander and Fain elaborated: 
It is extremely rare for universities to use 
outside lawyers to handle their contract 
negotiations. Most large public universities that 
stand to face serious scrutiny during the hiring 
process have large legal staffs accustomed to the 
various moving parts of a university and familiar 
with its culture and mind-set. 
But these lawyers also shoulder a heavy 
workload in many other areas. Their top priority is 
not to draw up coaches’ contracts and haggle over 
how many courtesy cars a coach gets. 
Given the workloads of many university lawyers 
and the hardball nature of contract negotiations, 
some in college sports think universities may have 
to turn to outside help.194 
Rather than hire outside legal help, the trend at an 
overwhelming majority of schools is to hire an outside consultant 
or headhunter that specializes in collegiate athletics to help with 
the search for coaching candidates.195 
A tactic used by agents to increase demand for their clients is 
to create a new perception, often using the media to push their 
clients’ names as candidates for vacant coaching positions or 
 
 193 Sander & Fain, supra note 100. 
 194 Id.   Former NCAA President Myles Brand tended to agree:  “I think universities 
need to get good advice on contracts. . . .  Some universities do, some don’t.  There could 
be someone on campus, or they should hire an attorney who specializes in contract law 
for sports.” Curtis, The Kingmakers: Part II, supra note 189 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 195 See Brian Curtis, The Kingmakers: Part IV: Search Consultants Are Seamlessly 
Weaving Their Way Into the Coaching Search Web, CSTV.COM, Jan. 31, 2008, 
http://www.cstv.com/sports/m-footbl/stories/013108aag.html.  Consulting services  
typically include “gauging candidate interest, presenting candidates to decision-makers, 
performing background checks and setting up interviews . . . .” Id.  “Because of the 
tremendous amount of media coverage for most searches, some headhunters . . . keep no 
paper trail of their contacts—no e-mails, no letters, etc., to protect the process from 
Freedom of Information Act requests from the media.” Id. 
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“soon-to-be” vacancies.196  Athletic department officials panic over 
speculation that a coach is considering an offer from another 
school or an NFL team, and regardless of whether the threat is real 
or simply created by the “rumor mill,” coaches often receive salary 
raises because of it.  For example, when Arkansas reached out to 
Auburn’s football coach, Tommy Tuberville, about its opening and 
the media reported that Tuberville might go, Auburn panicked out 
of fear of losing its coach and gave him a $200,000 raise despite 
the $6 million buyout in his contract that would be owed to Auburn 
if he left.197  In another example, after only seven games into his 
first season at Notre Dame, agent Bob LaMonte persuaded Notre 
Dame to extend Charlie Weis’s original contract in large part 
because LaMonte was successful in convincing Notre Dame about 
the prospective NFL interest in Weis after his fast start.198  “So for 
LaMonte and another leading coaches agent, Gary O’Hagan, who 
is believed to represent many current NFL and collegiate clients, 
the threat of more potential employers (both in the NCAA and the 
NFL) making viable offers to their clients makes their jobs 
easier.”199  Nebraska Chancellor Harvey Perlman said, “Agents 
make me worry sometimes about coaches ‘playing the game,’ with 
ulterior agendas . . . perhaps to try and get a raise at their job.”200  
Coaches add fuel to the fire when they could put an end to the 
speculation by simply announcing, “I’m not leaving,” but instead 
they “tip-toe around the media inquiries, usually responding that 
‘I’m happy here’ or ‘I plan to be the coach here.’”201 
2. Boosters 
It is widely speculated that donors often play a significant role 
in the decisions to hire and fire coaches.  The level of donor 
influence appears to vary depending upon the particular school, 
which can take the form of no involvement whatsoever, merely 
giving input or advice, or making pressured threats to withhold 
 
 196 Curtis, The Kingmakers: Part II, supra note 189. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Lattinville & Boland, supra note 188, at 122. 
 199 Id. (citations omitted). 
 200 Curtis, The Kingmakers: Part II, supra note 189 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 201 Id.; see also Self Wants to Stay at Kansas, supra note 78. 
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contributions, or actually making the decision regarding who to 
fire and hire.202  Donors that contribute significant amounts of 
money “carry significant weight at some schools, especially if they 
are the ones asked to pony up significant amounts of cash to lure a 
coach.”203  One prominent agent who has been involved in dozens 
of coaching searches insists that, in 90% of the searches he has 
been involved with, “there is a middleman [donor] involved [and] 
[t]he average fan doesn’t understand that at some places, major 
donors make a lot of the decisions.”204  Needless to say, if a donor 
is pushing to hire a certain individual, that coach has tremendous 
leverage during the hiring and contract negotiation process. 
3. Recruiting Cheap Talent 
Professional and collegiate sports are a unique product in that 
the athletes playing in the sports not only produce the product, they 
are the product.  The consumers of this product spend billions of 
dollars to watch, in person and on television, the few individuals 
on the field and court who are producing the game.  The high value 
of the players’ labor to produce this product is evident by looking 
at professional sports, where individual club player payrolls can 
range from $50 to $200 million annually.205  While big-time 
college sports constitute a huge commercial enterprise generating 
billions in annual revenues, the NCAA and its member institutions 
do not share any of the revenues with the players who generate 
it.206  Thus, schools do not have the huge player payroll burden that 
 
 202 For a discussion and examples of booster influence on coaching decisions at various 
schools, see Brian Curtis, The Kingmakers: Part III: Roles of Donors in Coaching 
Searches Debated by Administrators, CSTV.COM, Jan. 30, 2008,  
http://www.cstv.com/sports/m-footbl/stories/013008aau.html [hereinafter Curtis, The  
Kingmakers: Part III]. 
 203 Id. (“Universities are often limited by what they can pay a coach or his assistants, 
which is supplemented by private donors . . . .”). 
 204 Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting agent 
Jimmy Sexton). 
 205 See ESPN.com, New York Yankees Salaries, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/teams/ 
salaries?team=nyy (last visited Sept. 24, 2009) (calculating the 2009 New York Yankees 
payroll to be $208,097,414); HoopsHype, NBA Salaries, http://hoopshype.com/salaries 
.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2009). 
 206 “The N.C.A.A.’s notion of amateurism continues to boggle the mind.  It is ill 
defined at best, hypocritical at worst.  The N.C.A.A. embraces a version of amateurism 
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offsets the revenue generated like the professional sports teams, 
which means a larger percentage of revenue generated by a 
school’s football and basketball program is available to fund the 
coach’s salary.207  This gives college coaches greater leverage in 
the hiring process. 
Financial documents obtained by The Indianapolis Star 
through public records requests revealed that “43 of the 50 public 
school teams in [the 2005 NCAA March Madness basketball] 
tournament generated a combined $267 million for their athletic 
departments” and “gave out a total of $12 million in men’s 
basketball scholarships.”208  A professional club generating that 
kind of revenue would spend five to ten times that amount on 
players’ salaries.209  Moreover, the coach-to-player spending ratio 
in big-time collegiate sports is lopsided compared to professional 
sports.  The Indianapolis Star’s study, “based on data obtained 
through public-records requests to the 215 public universities that 
compete in Division I,” found that the coaching staffs from the 
teams in the 2006 Final Four made $5.3 million the previous year, 
and those four schools spent a total of $1 million on men’s 
basketball scholarships.210  The average head coach’s salary in the 
NBA is $4 million, and $3 million in the NFL,211 which is 
comparable to the salaries of the top collegiate basketball and 
football coaches.212  Indeed, the highest-paid major league baseball 
 
that allows the men’s tournament to rake in millions on the backs of talented athletes—
without sharing revenue with those responsible for generating it.” William C. Rhoden, In 
Tournaments, N.C.A.A. Shines at Its Athletes’ Expense, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2009, at D4, 
available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/06/sports/ncaabasketball/06rhoden 
.html?_r=3. 
 207 See Van Riper, supra note 10 (“[T]he big businesses of college football and 
basketball create genuine wage competition for head coaches.  That’s something minor 
league baseball doesn’t do for the wallets of big league managers.  There aren’t many 
fans filling out brackets for the Triple-A playoffs.”). 
 208 Mark Alesia, Tourney Money Fuels Pay-To-Play Debate, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 
1, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Alesia, Tourney Money]. 
 209 See, e.g., supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 210 Alesia, Tourney Money, supra note 208. 
 211 Van Riper, supra note 10. 
 212 See Lattinville & Boland, supra note 188, at 116 (“[I]n the last decade, top college 
programs have begun paying on a scale equal to the NFL . . . .”). 
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coach makes less than the highest-paid collegiate football coach.213  
Ellen Staurowsky, professor of sport management at Ithaca 
College and a member of the Drake Group, noted that “[t]he 
hidden part of the budget (in big-time college sports) is the 
artificial suppressing of the value of the people making this 
run.”214  The suppressed value of college players at the top 
revenue-generating schools means more money is available for 
coaches whose values most certainly are not suppressed. 
According to Mark Alesia of The Indianapolis Star, “[b]ecause 
athletes’ ‘compensation’ is capped—at the value of a 
scholarship—one way of looking at players’ worth is through the 
money spent to get them.”215  The Indianapolis Star’s records 
request showed that the 164 schools responding to the request 
spent a total of $35 million on recruiting in football and men’s 
basketball in 2005, which is an average of slightly more than 
$200,000 per school.216  The four schools in the 2005 Final Four 
spent an average of $505,000 on recruiting for athletes who 
eventually signed scholarships with the schools.217  The $200,000–
$500,000 spent annually by a school to recruit the very athletes 
who generate the revenue in big-time collegiate athletics—$75 to 
$120 million at the top twenty schools218—is a very cheap payroll 
expense.  However, the scholarship and recruiting expenses 
certainly do not represent the players’ market value because they 
are unable to freely market their services to the highest-bidding 
schools. 
The key to maintaining a successful program is winning, and 
the key to winning is to recruit and sign the top talent.  Because 
there is relatively little variance among schools in the amounts they 
spend annually in recruiting and “capped” scholarships expense, 
the schools obtain a competitive advantage in recruiting by hiring 
and keeping the coaches who are the best recruiters.  The 
 
 213 Van Riper, supra note 10 (“The Dodgers’ Joe Torre, baseball’s highest-paid 
manager at $4.3 million a year, is the third highest-paid head man in Los Angeles, behind 
the NBA Lakers’ Phil Jackson and (barely) USC football coach Pete Carroll.”). 
 214 Alesia, Tourney Money, supra note 208 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
 218 See Top Revenue Producers, supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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suppressed market value of the players is shifted to the salaries of 
coaches, who, unlike the players, are able to freely market their 
services to the highest bidders.  A coach who gives the school a 
competitive advantage in recruiting not only drives up the coach’s 
market value, but also gives the coach a lot of leverage in 
negotiating compensation. 
II. THE UNIVERSITY’S REMEDIES UPON BREACH 
As discussed above, a coach who is terminated by the school 
without cause before the expiration of the contract term is entitled 
to compensation.219  When the tables are turned and a coach leaves 
the school for a more lucrative deal at another institution prior to 
the expiration of the contract term, the coach has committed a 
breach of contract.220  The available remedies for a breach in this 
situation, in theory, consist of suing for damages, seeking a 
negative injunction to prevent the coach from working for the other 
institution, or simply canceling the contract and allowing the coach 
to leave.221  But as one scholar noted, the relationship between the 
school and the coach is “somewhat unbalanced” because “[w]hile 
the coach has clear contractual remedies against the university for 
breach of contract, the same may not be true if the coach decides to 
terminate performance.”222  To combat the imbalance in the 
relationship between school and coach, in recent years more 
schools have begun to insist upon a liquidated damages provision 
in the contract. 
A. Liquidated Damages Clauses 
When a coach breaches by leaving prior to the expiration of the 
term, schools are increasingly seeking to be compensated in some 
 
 219 See Sander & Fain, supra note 100. 
 220 See MITTEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 372. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Greenberg, supra note 5, at 245–46.  “The advantage may lie with the coach ‘who 
can breach the contract and leave the relationship with virtual impunity.’” Id. at 246 
(quoting Judson Graves, Commentary, Coaches in the Courtroom: Recovery in Actions 
for Breach of Employment Contracts, 12 J.C. & U.L. 545, 548 (1985)). 
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form by the breaching coach,223 just as the coach is compensated 
when the university fires him.  The compensation is typically paid 
to the school pursuant to a liquidated damages provision in the 
contract, which is negotiated between the two sides and often paid 
by the breaching coach’s new institution.224  Similar to the typical 
buyout clause when the coach is fired by the institution, the 
amount owed under the liquidated damages clause is greatest when 
the coach leaves early in the contract term and the amount 
decreases incrementally as the termination date gets closer to the 
end of the term.  Oftentimes the amount owed is based upon the 
coach’s base salary multiplied by the number of years remaining 
on the term of the contract at the time of the termination.225  For 
example, in Vanderbilt University v. DiNardo,226 the liquidated 
damages provision at issue provided that if the coach resigns or 
otherwise terminates his employment, and is employed or 
performing services for a person or institution other than 
Vanderbilt, he would “pay to the University as liquidated damages 
an amount equal to his Base Salary, less amounts that would 
otherwise be deducted or withheld from his Base Salary for income 
and social security tax purposes, multiplied by the number of years 
(or portion(s) thereof) remaining on the Contract.”227 
The pertinent question regarding liquidated damages provisions 
is whether they are designed to compensate the school for damages 
incurred for the loss of the coach’s services or rather to penalize 
the coach for leaving.  DiNardo is the seminal case on the validity 
of liquidated damages provisions in coaches’ contracts.  Gerry 
DiNardo resigned as Vanderbilt’s head football coach to accept the 
head football coaching position at Louisiana State University, and 
Vanderbilt brought suit to enforce the liquidated damages 
 
 223 See MITTEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 372. 
 224 Id.  For specific examples of liquidated damages provisions, see Greenberg, supra 
note 5, at 248–52. 
 225 See, e.g., Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751, 757 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[U]sing 
the number of years left on the contract multiplied by the salary per year was a reasonable 
way to calculate damages considering the difficulty of ascertaining damages with 
certainty.”). 
 226 174 F.3d 751 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 227 Id. at 753–54.  The coach’s base salary was initially set at $100,000, and he received 
salary increases in following years. Id. at 754. 
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provision.228  The coach argued that the liquidated damages 
provision in his contract was a “thinly disguised, overly broad non-
compete provision” and constituted an unenforceable penalty 
under Tennessee law.229  Under Tennessee law, similar to most 
jurisdictions, “a provision will be considered one for liquidated 
damages, rather than a penalty, if it is reasonable in relation to the 
anticipated damages for breach, measured prospectively at the time 
the contract was entered into, and not grossly disproportionate to 
the actual damages.”230  The district court held that, “given the 
nature of the unquantifiable damages in the case,” the use of a 
formula based on a coach’s salary to calculate the liquidated 
damages was reasonable, and further explained: 
“The potential damage to [Vanderbilt] extends far 
beyond the cost of merely hiring a new head 
football coach. It is this uncertain potentiality that 
the parties sought to address by providing for a sum 
certain to apply towards anticipated expenses and 
losses.  It is impossible to estimate how the loss of a 
head football coach will affect alumni relations, 
public support, football ticket sales, contributions, 
etc. . . .  As such, to require a precise formula for 
calculating damages resulting from the breach of 
contract by a college head football coach would be 
tantamount to barring the parties from stipulating to 
liquidated damages evidence in advance.”231 
In rejecting the coach’s contention that his salary has no 
relationship to the damages incurred by the university, which, 
according to the coach would not go beyond the cost of hiring a 
replacement coach, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court’s ruling and upheld the liquidated damages provision 
because both parties understood and agreed that the coach’s 
resignation would result in damage to the university beyond the 
 
 228 Id. at 753. 
 229 Id. at 755 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. at 755–56 (alteration in original) (quoting Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 974 F. 
Supp. 638, 642 (M.D. Tenn. 1997)).  The district court entered judgment against the 
coach for $281,886.43, and the coach appealed. Id. at 755. 
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cost of hiring a replacement.232  Applying the standard for 
enforceability of liquidated damages clauses, the court of appeals 
held that “using the number of years left on the contract multiplied 
by the salary per year was a reasonable way to calculate damages 
considering the difficulty of ascertaining damages with 
certainty.”233  The court of appeals noted that the coach was hired 
for “a unique and specialized position, and the parties understood 
that the amount of damages could not be easily ascertained should 
a breach occur.”234  Finally, the court of appeals even hinted that 
there was nothing particularly unfair about the liquidated damages 
provision in that it “was reciprocal and the result of negotiations 
between two parties, each of whom was represented by 
counsel.”235 
The dissenting judge in DiNardo, Judge David Nelson, 
believed that the liquidated damages provision functioned as a 
penalty and was not intended to make the university whole as a 
result of “being left in the lurch.”236  First, noting that the provision 
only makes the coach liable for liquidated damages if he is 
employed or performing services for another university during the 
unexpired term of the contract, “how the coach spends his post-
resignation time could not reasonably be expected to affect the 
university’s damages.”237  Second, Judge Nelson questioned how a 
formula based on the coach’s “‘take-home pay’” and tied to the 
 
 232 Id. at 756 (“Vanderbilt offered the two-year contract extension to DiNardo well over 
a year before his original contract expired.  Both parties understood that the extension 
was to provide stability to the program, which helped in recruiting players and retaining 
assistant coaches.”). 
 233 Id. at 757.  The court of appeals determined that “Vanderbilt did not need to 
undertake an analysis to determine actual damages” and “[t]he fact that liquidated 
damages declined each year DiNardo remained under contract, is directly tied to the 
parties’ express understanding of the importance of a long-term commitment from 
DiNardo.” Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id.  “The contract also contained reciprocal liquidated damage provisions. 
Vanderbilt agreed to pay DiNardo his remaining salary should Vanderbilt replace him as 
football coach, and DiNardo agreed to reimburse Vanderbilt should he leave before his 
contract expired.” Id. at 753. 
 236 Id. at 760 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 237 Id. (“[S]hould the coach choose to quit in order to lie on a beach somewhere, the 
university would presumably suffer the same damages that it would suffer if he quit to 
coach for another school.”). 
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number of years remaining on the contract could possibly 
constitute a reasonable estimate of the university’s damages.238  
According to the judge, the university’s actual damages are the 
proper measure of recovery and the case should have been 
remanded to the district court for a determination of the extent of 
any actual damages suffered by the university as a result of the 
coach’s breach.239  But this last point merely begs the question 
posited by the majority as well as the district court, which 
essentially formed the basis of the majority’s ruling, and that is, 
how can the actual damages suffered by the university be 
quantified? 
A lawsuit that garnered much attention and publicity recently, 
and that put to the test the “reasonable measure of the university’s 
damages” standard, was West Virginia University v. Rodriguez.240  
In 2007, West Virginia’s then head football coach, Rich 
Rodriguez, resigned and accepted the head coaching position at the 
University of Michigan.241  At issue in the lawsuit was the validity 
of a $4 million liquidated damages provision in Rodriguez’s 
contract with West Virginia.242  In July of 2008, a settlement was 
reached in which Rodriguez and Michigan agreed to pay $1.5 
 
 238 Id. at 760–61.  “[I] am aware of no reason to believe that damages arising from the 
need to replace a prematurely departing coach could reasonably be expected to vary in 
direct proportion to the number of years left on the coach’s contract.” Id. at 760.  The 
dissenting judge further wrote: 
[T]he use of a “take-home pay” measuring stick suggests that the 
function of the stick was to rap the coach’s knuckles and not to 
measure the university’s loss.  Such factors as the number of tax 
exemptions claimed by the coach, or the percentage of his pay that he 
might elect to shelter in a 401(k) plan, would obviously bear no 
relation at all to the university’s anticipated damages. 
Id. at 761. 
 239 Id. at 761. 
 240 No. 1:08 (N.D. W. Va. filed Sept. 27, 2007); see, e.g., Posting of Howard M. 
Wasserman to West Virginia University College of Law Sports & Entertainment Law 
Society, West Virginia University v. Richard Rodriguez: The Legal Perspective, 
http://richrodriguezlaw.blogspot.com/ (July 13, 2008, 12:05 EST) (discussing and 
analyzing the events as the Rodriguez lawsuit unfolded and posting links to documents 
filed in the case). 
 241 See, e.g., MITTEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 377–78 (citing Vicki Smith, Rodriguez, 
Michigan to Pay WVU $4 Million, PITTSBURG TRIB.-REV., July 10, 2008). 
 242 See id. 
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million and $2.5 million, respectively, to West Virginia.243  
Interestingly, the employment agreement between Rodriguez and 
Michigan includes a $4 million liquidated damages provision.244  
Even though the lawsuit lacks the value of legal precedent in that it 
settled prior to a judicial determination on the enforceability of the 
liquidated damages provision, which involved a much steeper 
liquidated damages amount than was at issue in the DiNardo case, 
the Rodriguez settlement will most certainly be relied upon by 
schools seeking to enforce liquidated damages provisions against 
coaches jumping ship. 
West Virginia’s refusal to settle the case for less than the full 
amount of the liquidated damages clause tends to suggest that the 
University believed it had a relatively strong case, and perhaps 
rightfully so.  As the district court in DiNardo found, and the 
majority on appeal agreed, it is extremely difficult to quantify the 
actual damages to the university attributable to the loss of a head 
football coach, which includes, among other things, the affect on 
alumni relations, public support, football ticket sales and 
contributions.245  Even Judge Nelson did not express disagreement 
with the majority on that point.  While Judge Nelson criticized the 
liquidated damages formula in the contract as bearing little or no 
relation to a reasonable estimate of the university’s anticipated 
damages and he would have remanded the case to the district court 
for a determination of the university’s actual damages,246 the judge 
did not offer any alternative formula that would bear such a 
relation nor did he offer any explanation as to how the lower court 
could determine the actual damages incurred by the university.  
And therein lies the problem, and in fact lends support for 
enforceability because “liquidated damages clauses are inserted 
 
 243 See id.  As part of the settlement, Michigan agreed to pay Rodriguez’s attorney’s 
fees incurred in the litigation. Id. at 377.  “The amounts due to institutions under such 
provisions are often paid by the breaching coaches’ new institutions.” Id. at 372. 
 244 See id. at 377–78. 
 245 Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751, 755–56 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing 
Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 974 F. Supp. 638, 642–43 (M.D. Tenn. 1997)). 
 246 Id. at 760–61 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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where damages from breach are uncertain, not when they can be 
precisely ascertained.”247 
Judge Nelson’s argument that the university’s damages could 
not be “expected to vary in direct proportion to the number of 
years left on the coach’s contract”248 is misplaced.  Judge Nelson 
overlooked the primary basis for the majority’s decision, which 
was that the university wanted a five-year contract because, as the 
contract language expressly provided, “a long-term commitment 
by DiNardo was important to the University’s desire for a stable 
intercollegiate football program and that this commitment was of 
essence to the contract.”249  Moreover, when the university offered 
a two-year extension well over a year before the original contract 
expired, it signaled that “[b]oth parties understood that the 
extension was to provide stability to the program, which helped in 
recruiting players and retaining assistant coaches.”250  Thus, 
“stability” is what the university gets in return for the coach’s 
guaranteed salary commitment, and when the coach leaves before 
the expiration of the term, the university loses the stability.  It is 
the loss of stability that constitutes the university’s damages and 
which are difficult to quantify.  However, when the parties attempt 
to prospectively measure the university’s anticipated damages at 
the time they enter the contract, it is not unreasonable for the 
parties to agree that the uncertain amount of damages (whatever 
that amount may be) attributable to the loss of stability would vary 
depending upon the number of years of stability the university lost 
at the time the coach commits the breach.  In the words of the 
majority, “[t]he fact that liquidated damages declined each year 
DiNardo remained under contract, is directly tied to the parties’ 
express understanding of the importance of a long-term 
commitment from DiNardo.”251  It would also not be unreasonable 
for the parties to measure anticipated damages based upon a lump 
 
 247 Beasley v. Horrell, 864 S.W.2d 45, 49 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the 
cancellation provision in interest-bearing, non-negotiable promissory note, providing note 
would be cancelled and void if noteholder failed to make any payment under leases 
executed in conjunction with note, was an unenforceable penalty). 
 248 See DiNardo, 174 F. 3d at 760 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 249 Id. at 756 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. at 757. 
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sum payment irrespective of the number of years remaining on the 
contract at the time the coach resigns.252 
In the absence of a liquidated damages provision in the 
contract, what recourse does the university have when a coach 
leaves before the expiration of the contract term?  Simply 
canceling the contract and allowing the coach to leave is one 
option.  This option effectively makes the coach’s long-term 
contractual commitment meaningless and the contract tantamount 
to a one-way street in which the university is bound for the entire 
length of the contract but the coach is not.  Despite the fact that the 
coach is clearly in breach for leaving, institutions often avoid 
litigation partly because they believe litigation is costly and tends 
to prolong negative public relations which can cast a shadow over 
the athletic program for years to come.253  “As a result, most 
employees, and certainly most coaches, have historically been able 
to leave their employment virtually at will despite their prior 
contractual commitments.”254  The available legal remedies to the 
university are to sue the coach for damages or injunctive relief. 
B. Suing for Damages 
A bedrock principle of contract law is that “[d]amages for 
breach of contract should be sufficient ‘to place the plaintiff in the 
position he would be in if the contract had been fulfilled.’”255  
Consequential damages such as lost profits may also be recovered 
for breach of an employment contract if the employer can show 
 
 252 However, some courts have held that a lump sum payment that makes “no attempt to 
graduate the amount according to the length of the unexpired part of the term” constitutes 
a penalty, not liquidated damages. Beasley, 864 S.W.2d at 49 (quoting Jennings v. First 
Nat’l Bank, 30 S.W.2d 1049, 1053 (Mo. App. 1930)).  These cases are distinguishable 
because the breach in these cases consisted of a failure to make required payments during 
the term of the contract, and, thus, a lump sum payment that does not differentiate based 
on the timing of the breach is not a valid attempt at making a reasonable estimate of the 
damages that could result from missed or late payments. See id. at 49–50; Jennings, 30 
S.W.2d at 1053. 
 253 See Greenberg, supra note 5, at 246. 
 254 Graves, supra note 222, at 549. 
 255 Eckles v. Sharman, 548 F.2d 905, 910 (10th Cir. 1977) (quoting C. MCCORMICK, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW ON DAMAGES § 137, at 560 (1935)) (holding that in order to 
recover for lost profits, plaintiff basketball team was required to show coach was unique 
or irreplaceable). 
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that those damages were reasonably foreseeable when the contract 
was made.256  In cases where an employee is in breach of an 
employment agreement, 
the recoverable damages are normally measured by 
the cost to the employer of obtaining equivalent 
services elsewhere, plus consequential damages.  
Some cases indicate that in assessing such damages, 
the “market value” of the lost services must be 
measured against that of the substitute services 
procured by the employer to remedy the breach.257 
Thus, in theory, damages under the normal measure would 
consist of the difference in salary of the existing coach and the 
substitute coach and any incidental costs incurred by the school in 
locating and signing the substitute coach, plus consequential 
damages related to the coach’s breach.  Because coaches are not 
fungible, a court could conclude that any salary differential that 
resulted from the hiring of a more talented substitute coach thereby 
caused no net loss to the team.258  Conversely, a court could 
determine that the school, when suddenly faced with a vacancy as 
a result of its coach’s decision to leave, had to pay more than 
market value for the substitute coach, in which case the school 
would be entitled to the difference between the “true” market value 
of the substitute coach and the “inflated” market value that the 
school paid to get him. 
The market value of a coach’s services is extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, to determine thereby making it impractical to apply 
 
 256 See id. at 910 (“[T]he elements of the plaintiff’s (employer’s) damages are two: the 
reasonably necessary expense to which plaintiff was put in procuring a new agent, and 
the loss of profits (if any profits were lost) caused by defendants’ breach.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Steelduct Co. v. Henger-Seltzer Co., 160 P.2d 804, 
812 (Cal. 1945))). 
 257 Graves, supra note 222, at 548–49 (citations omitted). 
 258 Cf. LAW OF PROFESSIONAL & AMATEUR SPORTS § 10:21 (Gary A. Uberstine ed., 
West Group 1989) (2008) (recognizing a similar problem in the context of a professional 
athlete’s breach).  Uberstine also suggests an alternative measure of damages that would 
focus on the salary differential between the athlete’s original contract and his new 
contract with the other team. Id.  Uberstine notes that this methodology could be 
undesirable from the team’s standpoint because its losses would typically exceed the 
salary differential, but it would deter athletes from jumping ship solely for the financial 
benefit. Id. 
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the normal measure of employment contract damages to college 
coaches’ contracts.259  The value of a coach to one school’s athletic 
program may not be the same to another school’s athletic program.  
The same holds true in trying to determine the market value of a 
player’s services, as articulated by Professor Geoffrey Rapp: 
The services of a player are “extremely difficult to 
value and impossible to prove.”  Sports contracts do 
have a relative advantage over, say, opera contracts, 
in that sports contracts can be compared to one 
another in relative worth using player statistics. It is 
possible to determine if players are “under” or 
“over” paid given their performance and prevalent 
market trends.  However, a significant problem 
remains.  The value of a player to a team may not 
be the same as the overall “market value” of the 
player.  It is “exceedingly burdensome to establish 
what the loss of one player, even a superstar player, 
will have on the club’s performance and its 
financial condition.”  As a result of these 
limitations, there are no recorded cases in which a 
club successfully pursued a claim for damages 
against an athlete.260 
Rather than focusing on a coach’s market value, damage to the 
university as a result of a coach’s failure or refusal to perform 
should focus on the school’s total economic loss, i.e. the loss of 
stability in the program, which includes, among other things, the 
monetary loss flowing from its adverse impact on alumni relations, 
public support, ticket sales, contributions, recruiting, retaining 
assistant coaches and admissions.261  However, it is extremely 
difficult to assign a dollar value to these losses incurred, not to 
mention the causation problems in determining whether such 
losses were due to the coach’s breach.  Because of the difficulty in 
determining the university’s damages, the school may instead opt 
 
 259 See Greenberg, supra note 5, at 246. 
 260 Geoffrey Rapp, Affirmative Injunctions in Athletic Employment Contracts:  
Rethinking the Place of the Lumley Rule in American Sports Law, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. 
REV. 261, 269–70 (2006) (citations omitted). 
 261 See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
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for injunctive relief to prevent the coach from accepting 
employment at another institution. 
C. Injunctive Relief 
In contracts for personal services, including employment 
agreements, courts of equity refuse to grant injunctive relief in the 
nature of specific performance, i.e. ordering an individual to 
perform a contract, due to (1) the inherent difficulty or 
impossibility of enforcing and supervising the performance and 
quality of uniquely personal efforts, (2) the undesirability of 
compelling the continuance of personal association after disputes 
have arisen and confidence and loyalty are gone, and (3) the view 
that judicial compulsion of services violates the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude.262  However, 
“where an employee refuses to render services to an employer in 
violation of an existing contract, and the services are unique or 
extraordinary, an injunction may issue to prevent the employee 
from furnishing those services to another person for the duration of 
the contract.”263  Under such circumstances, a “negative 
injunction” is warranted because (a) the employee either expressly 
or by clear implication agreed not to work elsewhere during the 
 
 262 See Am. Broad. Co. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 366 (N.Y. 1981); 42 AM. JUR. 2D 
Injunctions § 127 (2009).  But see Rapp, supra note 260, at 263–64 (advocating for 
specific performance enforceable by affirmative injunction as a remedy for breach of 
contract when players hold out). 
 263 Wolf, 420 N.E.2d at 367 (citing Shubert Theatrical Co. v. Gallagher, 201 N.Y.S. 
577, 579–81 (1923)); see also Boston Celtics Ltd. P’ship v. Shaw, 908 F.2d 1041, 1048–
49 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting general policy of disfavoring enforcement of personal service 
contracts in the sports context “typically prevents a court from ordering an individual to 
perform a personal service; it does not prevent a court from ordering an individual to 
rescind a contract for services and to refrain from performing a service for others.” 
(citations omitted)); Minn. Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979, 987 (M.D.N.C. 
1969) (“It is generally held that where a person agrees to render personal services to 
another, which require special and unique knowledge, skill and ability, so that in default 
the same services cannot easily be obtained from others, a court of equity is empowered 
to negatively enforce performance of the agreement by enjoining its breach.”); Dallas 
Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d 37, 42 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (“It is 
well established in this State and other jurisdictions that injunctive relief will be granted 
to restrain violation by an employee of negative covenants in a personal service contract 
if the employee is a person of exceptional and unique knowledge, skill and ability in 
performing the service called for in the contract.”). 
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term of the contract and (b) when the requisite unique services 
element is met, the employer would be irreparably harmed if the 
employee is permitted to work for a competitor.264  Moreover, the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude265 
does not pose the same concern that is present with affirmative 
injunctions in personal services contracts because with a negative 
injunction the coach is free to quit and the court is not ordering the 
coach to work.266  To obtain a negative injunction, the school must 
demonstrate that it is irreparably harmed by the coach’s breach and 
must show absence of substantial harm to the coach, other 
interested parties and the public interest if the injunction is 
granted.267 
1. Irreparable Harm: The Unique Skills Test 
There is a paucity of cases in which a professional team or 
school has sought a negative injunction to prevent a coach from 
jumping prior to the expiration of the contract term.  The seminal 
case is New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University of 
Colorado,268 in which the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a 
preliminary injunction enjoining the University of Colorado from 
hiring Chuck Fairbanks as its head football coach, who was at the 
 
 264 See Wolf, 420 N.E.2d at 367 (noting that when the plaintiff seeks to enjoin the 
employee from performing for someone else, the “negative injunction” is a standard 
remedy in the sports and entertainment industries).  This notion of a negative injunction 
emanates from the classic case of Lumley v. Wagner in which the Queen’s Theatre sought 
injunctive relief to require opera star Johanna Wagner to perform her contract and to 
prevent her from performing elsewhere, and the court held that the theatre could not get 
specific performance to compel Wagner to perform for the Queen’s Theatre but could 
obtain a negative injunction to prevent her from performing elsewhere. Lumley v. 
Wagner, (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch.). 
 265 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”). 
 266 But cf. Rapp, supra note 260, at 278 (arguing that even when an affirmative 
injunction is sought in athletic contract disputes, the Thirteenth Amendment should not 
be a defense because “the Amendment’s target was slavery and its attendant 
circumstances, not a relationship between a multi-millionaire athlete and a sports 
franchise owned by multi-millionaires.”). 
 267 See generally Wolf, 420 N.E.2d at 403 (“[S]ince the services must be unique before 
negative enforcement will be granted, irreparable harm will befall the employer should 
the employee be permitted to labor for a competitor.” (citation omitted)). 
 268 592 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1979). 
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time employed as head football coach of the New England Patriots 
under a contract that had five years remaining on it.269  Fairbanks’s 
contract with the Patriots contained a provision that, during the 
term, Fairbanks was not to provide services connected with 
football to any entity other than the plaintiff, or to perform services 
of any kind for anyone, without the plaintiff’s permission.270  In 
this regard, Judge Aldrich wrote: 
At the hearing Fairbanks testified that although the 
contract read “services directly connected with 
football . . . (or for) another entity not connected 
with football,” this meant, simply, activities 
competitively connected with the Patriots. . . . 
Parenthetically, having in mind, as sometimes 
helpless dial-spinners, that professional and 
prominent college football teams compete for TV 
viewers, and hence, presumably, for the advertising 
dollar, we may wonder whether we have to accept 
at face value the protestation of no competitive 
activity here.  In any event, there is ample authority 
contradicting both aspects of defendants’ legal 
position.  Indeed, some courts have gone even 
further, and have enjoined the defaulting athlete 
himself from noncompetitive sport.  We would not 
distinguish between an athlete and a coach.271 
The foregoing excerpt demonstrates that, in the view of the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals, there is sufficient “economic” 
competition between professional and collegiate sports teams such 
 
 269 Id. at 1198. 
 270 Id. at 1198 n.1 (“10(b) Fairbanks shall not render services directly connected with 
football during the period of his employment other than for the Patriots except with the 
express written permission of the Patriots, which permission shall not be unreasonably 
withheld.  (d) Fairbanks shall not render services to another entity not connected with 
football during the period of employment except with the express written permission of 
the Patriots, which permission shall not be unreasonably withheld.”); see also Greenberg, 
supra note 5, at 248 (noting that in many coaches’ contracts, “the coach will be required 
to promise not to accept employment under any circumstances as a coach at any other 
institution, or with any professional league, or with any other competing entity, without 
first obtaining permission from the university” (internal quotations marks omitted)). 
 271 New Eng. Patriots, 592 F.2d at 1200 (citations omitted). 
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that a professional club is irreparably harmed when a coach leaves 
before the expiration of his contract to accept employment at the 
collegiate level (and presumably vice-versa as well).272  Another 
significant aspect of the court of appeals’ ruling is that, by relying 
on the negative injunction cases involving professional players, a 
coach is similar to an athlete as it relates to the unique services 
element.273  This is consistent with the DiNardo court’s 
determination that the coach was hired for a “unique and 
specialized position.”274  The court of appeals in New England 
Patriots affirmed the district court’s findings that damages would 
be difficult to ascertain and that Fairbanks’ services were unique, 
and that, accordingly, the Patriots would be irreparably harmed by 
the loss of his services.275  Although the New England Patriots 
case was decided over thirty years ago, given the exponential 
increases in both revenue and coaches’ salaries since that time, the 
irreparable harm element is perhaps even more compelling today 
than it was back then. 
 
 272 See id.  As one scholar noted in discussing the case, “The competition may exist 
between teams in a league, teams in different leagues, or teams in different sports.” RAY 
YASSER, JAMES R. MCCURDY, C. PETER GOPLERUD & MAUREEN A. WESTON, SPORTS 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 469 (6th ed. 2006). 
 273 See New Eng. Patriots, 592 F.2d at 1200. 
In many instances, a coach’s contract will contain a unique service 
clause to protect the university from a breaching coach.  By agreeing 
to this clause, the coach acknowledges that he has a special, unique 
and exceptional skill, and that the university’s need for continuity in 
its coaching—as well as any further acquisition of coaching 
experience—will reflect that uniqueness. 
Greenberg, supra note 5, at 247–48. 
 274 Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751, 757 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 275 New Eng. Patriots, 592 F.2d at 1199.  The court of appeals also held that even 
though the Patriots allegedly lured Fairbanks from the University of Oklahoma, inducing 
him to break his contract there, the Patriots were not barred from relief by the doctrine of 
unclean hands. Id.  “Both [Fairbanks and the Patriots] may have done the University of 
Oklahoma dirt, but that does not mean unclean hands with respect to ‘the controversy in 
issue.’” Id.; see also Houston Oilers, Inc. v. Neely, 361 F.2d 36, 42–43 (10th Cir. 1966) 
(issuing injunction, rejecting defense of unclean hands based on club signing college 
player prior to completion of eligibility in violation of NCAA rules). But see N.Y. 
Football Giants, Inc. v. L.A. Football Club, Inc., 291 F.2d 471, 474 (5th Cir. 1961) 
(denying injunction on basis of defense of unclean hands resulting from club signing 
college player prior to completion of eligibility in violation of NCAA rules). 
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In Northeastern University v. Brown,276 Northeastern sought a 
negative injunction to prevent its head football coach, who was in 
the first year of a six-year contract, from accepting an offer to 
coach at the University of Massachusetts (“U. Mass.”).277  The 
court’s opinion commences with a quote from Detroit Football Co. 
v. Robinson278 that  
described these types of “contract jumping cases” 
with players and coaches as follows: 
“This case is but another round in the sordid 
fight for football players [or coaches] . . . It is a 
fight characterized by deception, double dealing, 
campus jumping, secret alumni subsidization, semi-
professionalism and professionalism.  It is a fight 
which has produced as part of its harvest this 
current rash of contract jumping suits.  It is a fight 
which so conditions the minds and hearts of these 
athletes [and coaches] that one day they can agree 
to play [or coach] football for a stated amount for 
one group, only to repudiate that agreement the 
following day or whenever a better offer comes 
along.”279 
Regarding irreparable harm, the court in Northeastern 
University focused on the competitive disadvantage to 
Northeastern and found that (1) at U. Mass. the coach would be 
able to use his knowledge of Northeastern’s program, plays and 
procedures against Northeastern, (2) Northeastern and U. Mass. 
compete with each other for recruits as well as for regional 
television coverage of their games, and (3) Northeastern and U. 
Mass. are members of the same football conference and play 
against each other every year.280  The judge therefore granted an 
interim injunction.281  One month later, the judge lifted the 
 
 276 No. 20040827F, 2004 WL 616225 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2004). 
 277 Id. at *1–*2. 
 278 186 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. La. 1960) (alteration in original). 
 279 Ne. Univ., 2004 WL 616225, at *1 (quoting Detroit Football Co., 186 F. Supp. at  
934). 
 280 Id. at *4. 
 281 Id. 
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injunction and instructed the parties to settle, which they ultimately 
did.282 
Due to the limited case law on the enforcement of coaches’ 
contracts through negative injunctions, it is also helpful to look at 
courts’ rationale for holding that professional athletes meet the 
unique services element for the issuance of negative injunctions.  
In Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris,283 the Dallas 
Cowboys, a member of the NFL, sought an injunction to restrain 
Harris, who was under contract with the Cowboys, from playing 
football for the Dallas Texans, a member of the American Football 
League.284  The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s order 
granting a temporary injunction in favor of the Cowboys.285  In 
doing so, the court of appeals explained what constitutes “unique” 
services and relied on the following statement from Philadelphia 
Ball Club v. Lajoie:286 
“We think, however, that in refusing relief unless 
the defendant’s services were shown to be of such a 
character as to render it impossible to replace him 
he has taken extreme ground. It seems to us that a 
more just and equitable rule is laid down in 
Pom.Spec.Perf. p. 31, where the principle is thus 
declared: ‘Where one person agrees to render 
personal services to another, which requires and 
presupposes a special knowledge skill, and ability in 
the employee, so that in case of a default the same 
service could not easily be obtained from others . . . 
its performance will be negatively enforced by 
enjoining its breach. . . .’ We have not found any 
case going to the [same] length of requiring, as a 
 
 282 See Mark Blaudschun, Settlement Is Reached on Brown; Umass, NU End Coach 
Saga, BOSTON GLOBE, May 13, 2004, at E1.  The University of Massachusetts paid 
Northeastern $150,000 and agreed to suspend Brown from coaching the first three games 
of the 2004–05 season. Id. 
 283 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). 
 284 Id. at 39–40. 
 285 Id. at 47 (“We cannot support harris’ [sic] contention that the contract is so 
unreasonable and harsh as to be unenforceable in equity.”). 
 286 51 A. 973 (Pa. 1902). 
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condition of relief, proof of the impossibility of 
obtaining equivalent service.”287 
The Dallas Cowboys court emphasized the test for uniqueness 
is that the service is not easily replaceable as opposed to being 
irreplaceable which is “too narrow and limited.”288 
The unique skills test satisfies the irreparable harm element for 
injunctive relief.289  Numerous courts have found that professional 
athletes meet the test;290 however, a small handful of courts have 
determined that money damages are an adequate remedy for the 
loss of an athlete’s services.291  The Lajoie case is beneficial to 
 
 287 Harris, 348 S.W.2d at 44 (quoting Lajoie, 51 A. at 973). 
 288 Id. at  44; see MITTEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 412 (“For the past century, 
[Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v.] Lajoie has represented the prevailing judicial view 
regarding the availability of equitable relief to remedy a professional athlete’s breach of 
contract.”). 
 289 See YASSER ET AL., supra note 272, at 467 (“The ‘irreparable harm’ requirement for 
the issuance of the negative injunction usually is determined by the ‘unique skills test.’”).  
For a case departing from the unique skills test and denying an injunction based upon the 
team’s economic position, see Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 
261, 269 (D. Mass. 1971) (“The irreparable harm, the probability of which must be 
shown by the corporate plaintiff, is harm to its financial and business health.”), remanded 
on other grounds, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972). But see LAW OF PROFESSIONAL & 
AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 258, § 10:19 (“Cheevers appears to be of dubious 
precedential value because the appellate court strongly questioned the validity of the 
lower court’s irreparable harm analysis. . . . [A]s subsequent cases have expressly 
‘balked’ on the Cheevers analysis and have continued to endorse the traditional 
irreparable harm/unique skills test.”). 
 290 See YASSER ET AL., supra note 272, at 467 (“Few cases are found involving 
professional sports athletes in which courts denied negative injunctions on the basis of 
inadequate or ordinary skills.”); see also Winnipeg Rugby Football Club v. Freeman & 
Locklear, 140 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Ohio 1955) (enjoining two rookies without any 
professional experience from jumping from a Canadian professional football club to the 
Cleveland Browns); Cent. N.Y. Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barnett, 181 N.E.2d 506 (Ohio 
C.P. 1961) (holding that professional players satisfy the unique test per se); Matuszak v. 
Houston Oilers, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (holding that the question of 
unique skills depends on facts of each case).  Injunctive relief to prevent players from 
jumping was sought as far back as the late 1800s in Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. 
Ewing, 42 F. 198 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890) and Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9 
N.Y.S. 779 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1890).  For an annotation of negative injunction cases by 
sport, see Cincinnati Bengals v. Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129, 139 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 1974). 
 291 See Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977); Conn. 
Prof’l Sports Corp. v. Heyman, 276 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Brooklyn Baseball 
Club v. McGuire, 116 F. 782 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1902); Columbus Base Ball Club v. Reiley, 
11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 272, 272 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pl. 1891). 
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understanding why teams are entitled to injunctive relief to prevent 
professional players from jumping because the court connects the 
dots between the unique skills test and the irreparable harm 
requirement for injunctive relief.292  As sports law experts have 
noted: “The court enunciated the question as not whether the 
player was ‘irreplaceable,’ but whether replacement of the player 
on the playing field could be translated into money damages.  
Thus, the question was whether harm was irreparable, or the 
damage remedy at law inadequate.”293 
Moreover, the Lajoie court’s discussion of how the irreparable 
harm element is met in the professional player context helps 
explain why the court in the New England Patriots case “would 
not distinguish between an athlete and a coach.”294  The glaring 
similarities between players and coaches for purposes of 
irreparable harm and the impact to the team are evident in the 
Lajoie court’s opinion: 
The court below finds from the testimony that “the 
defendant is an expert baseball player in any 
position; that he has a great reputation as a second 
baseman; that his place would be hard to fill with as 
good a player; that his withdrawal from the team 
would weaken it, as would the withdrawal of any 
good player, and would probably make a difference 
in the size of the audiences attending the game.” . . . 
 
 292 See Phila. Ball Club v. Lajoie, 51 A. 973, 976 (Pa. 1902). 
 293 YASSER ET AL., supra note 272, at 468.  According to the court in Lajoie: 
We have not found any case going to the length of requiring, as a 
condition of relief, proof of the impossibility of obtaining equivalent 
service.  It is true that the injury must be irreparable; but, as observed 
by Mr. Justice Lowrie in Com. v. Pittsburgh & C. R. Co., 24 Pa. 160, 
62 Am. Dec. 372:  “The argument that there is no ‘irreparable 
damage’ would not be so often used by wrongdoers if they would 
take the trouble to discover that the word ‘irreparable’ is a very 
unhappily chosen one, used in expressing the rule that an injunction 
may issue to prevent wrongs of a repeated and continuing character, 
or which occasion damages which are estimated only by conjecture, 
and not by any accurated standard.” 
Lajoie, 51 A. at 973. 
 294 New Eng. Patriots Football Club v. Univ. of Colo., 592 F.2d 1196, 1200 (1st Cir. 
1979); see Lajoie, 51 A. at 976. 
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He has been for several years in the service of the 
plaintiff club, and has been re-engaged from season 
to season at a constantly increasing salary. He has 
become thoroughly familiar with the action and 
methods of the other players in the club, and his 
own work is peculiarly meritorious as an integral 
part of the team work which is so essential. In 
addition to these features which render his services 
of peculiar and special value to the plaintiff, and not 
easily replaced, Lajoie is well known, and has great 
reputation among the patrons of the sport, for ability 
in the position which he filled, and was thus a most 
attractive drawing card for the public. 
. . . . 
. . . We have the further fact that the contract has 
been partially executed by services rendered, and 
payment made therefor, so that the situation is not 
now the same as when the contract was wholly 
executory.  The relation between the parties has 
been so far changed as to give to the plaintiff an 
equity, arising out of the part performance, to insist 
upon the completion of the agreement according to 
its terms by the defendant. . . .  The plaintiff has so 
far performed its part of the contract in entire good 
faith, in every detail, and it would therefore be 
inequitable to permit the defendant to withdraw 
from the agreement at this late day. 
. . . . 
. . . The defendant sold to the plaintiff, for a 
valuable consideration, the exclusive right to his 
professional services for a stipulated period, unless 
sooner surrendered by the plaintiff, which could 
only be after due and reasonable notice and 
payment of salary and expenses until the expiration. 
Why should not a court of equity protect such an 
agreement until it is terminated? The court cannot 
compel the defendant to play for the plaintiff, but it 
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can restrain him from playing for another club in 
violation of his agreement.295 
It is difficult to argue that college coaches at the major schools 
do not have unique skill because of the undisputable fact that there 
is a very limited supply of coaches whose services are in such high 
demand and who have the ability to command a salary that puts 
them among the most highly-compensated coaches in all of sports, 
both collegiate and professional.  Simply, if they did not have 
unique skill, they would not be paid accordingly.296  That is 
precisely why some coaches become icons at big-time collegiate 
athletic programs, such as Knute Rockne, Bobby Knight, Bo 
Schembechler, Woody Hayes, Paul “Bear” Bryant and “Coach K,” 
to name just a few.297  These individuals became household names 
because of their unique coaching skills and achievements.  The 
irreparable harm to the university when it loses its highly 
successful coach is the loss of stability to the athletic program 
which the Dinardo court referred to as “unquantifiable.”298  
Indeed, coaches’ contracts often include a clause providing that the 
coach acknowledges and agrees that the loss of his services prior to 
the expiration of the term would result in irreparable harm to the 
university.299  The irreparable harm element for injunctive relief 
should be fairly easy to satisfy when a school is requesting a 
 
 295 Lajoie, 51 A. at 974–75. 
 296 See Cent. N.Y. Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barnett, 181 N.E.2d 506, 517 (Ohio C.P. 
1961) (“Professional players in the major baseball, football, and basketball leagues have 
unusual talents and skills or they would not be so employed.  Such players . . . are not 
easily replaced.”). 
 297 See Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan Athletics History, 
http://bentley.umich.edu/athdept/football/coaches/gschemb.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 
2009); Indystar.com, Library Factfiles,  http://www2.indystar.com/library/factfiles/ 
people/k/knight_bob/knight.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2009); Ohio State History, Woody 
Hayes,  https://bucknuts.com/osuhistory/coachhayes.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2009); 
The   Official Website of Coach Mike Krzyzewski, http://coachk.com (last visited Sept. 
24, 2009). 
 298 Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751, 755–56 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 974 F. Supp. 638, 642 (M.D. Tenn. 1997)). 
 299 Greenberg, supra note 5, at 248 (“The contract will also require the coach to agree 
that the loss of his services, prior to the expiration of the contractual term and without the 
university approval, will cause an inestimable loss to the university, which cannot be 
adequately compensated for by money damages.”). 
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negative injunction to prevent the coach from accepting 
employment at another institution. 
2. Balancing the Hardships in Granting or Denying Injunctive 
Relief 
In addition to the requirement of irreparable harm to obtain 
injunctive relief, the plaintiff has the burden to show absence of 
substantial harm to the defendant, other interested parties and the 
public interest, if the injunction requested is granted.300  As one 
court noted, “[c]ourts of equity frequently, in resolving a question 
concerning injunctive relief, try to evaluate the balance of 
hardships on both parties that would result from the granting or the 
withholding of the injunction requested.”301  According to sports 
law experts, this is the greatest hurdle to obtaining a negative 
injunction: 
If a court finds the requested injunction will create 
an unreasonable hardship to the party sought to be 
restrained, the injunction will be denied or its scope 
may be limited.  What constitutes unreasonableness, 
or undue harshness, varies with the particular 
circumstances.  Factors considered by a court may 
include the length of the requested injunction, its 
geographical reach, the types of employment or 
activities prohibited under the injunction, and its 
potential effects in preventing employment or other 
opportunities for the restrained party.  However, 
these factors are balanced against the resulting 
damage to the plaintiff if an injunction is not 
granted.302 
 
 300 See Cincinnati Bengals v. Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129, 145 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (citing 
World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972)); 
see also Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261, 269 (D. Mass. 1971) 
(“It is usual practice for a court of equity, called upon to pass on a claim for injunctive 
relief, to weigh the consequences that the granting of the injunctive relief sought would 
have on all parties to the litigation.”). 
 301 Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. at 269. 
 302 MITTEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 415; see also LAW OF PROFESSIONAL & AMATEUR 
SPORTS, supra note 258, § 10:23 (“Even when a former team can establish the necessary 
prerequisites for equitable relief, courts nevertheless have wide discretion in deciding 
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In balancing the hardships to both parties and other interested 
parties when a coach leaves for a competitor before the expiration 
of his current contract, the substantial harm to the school, the 
public interest, and the student-athlete if an injunction is not 
granted far outweighs any harm to the coach and competitor school 
if the injunction is granted. 
a) Harm to the Parties: Preventing Unfair Competition for 
Coaches’ Services 
A major concern of the courts in balancing the harms in 
injunction proceedings is the impact on free and open competition 
in the marketplace if the injunction is granted.303  As this section 
will address, in the player context, courts have routinely denied 
injunctive relief to the club when a player signs with another club 
for services to commence after the expiration of the player’s 
existing contract.304  The reason being that there is no harm to the 
interest of the plaintiff nor the public when (1) the player 
(defendant) is not breaching his existing contract and is fully 
performing the obligations he agreed to perform for the entire 
contract term, and (2) the other club that desires to sign the player 
for services to commence after the expiration of the player’s 
existing contract has not tortiously interfered with the plaintiff’s 
contractual relationship with the player.305  Indeed, to grant an 
injunction under such circumstances has a chilling effect on 
competition and the ability of the player to freely market his 
services to the highest bidder. 306 
Such was the case in Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Bergey,307 in 
which the NFL Bengals sought an injunction to enjoin a player 
(Bergey) and clubs in a competing league (WFL) from signing 
 
whether to grant such relief.  In determining whether an injunction should issue, courts 
balance the competing needs of teams, players, and society at large.”). 
 303 See Bergey, 453 F. Supp. at 147 (“As we view it, the ‘public interest’ within the 
meaning of that phrase as it is used here is the policy such as that behind the antitrust 
laws to encourage to the fullest extent practicable free and open competition in the 
marketplace.  Restraints on competition are not favored.”). 
 304 See, e.g., id. at 149. 
 305 See, e.g., id. at 138. 
 306 See, e.g., id. 
 307 453 F. Supp. 129 (S.D. Ohio 1974). 
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players to contracts for future services to commence following the 
expiration of their contracts with the Bengals.  In denying an 
injunction, the court reasoned: 
[N]either the WFL nor Bergey committed a tortious 
or otherwise unlawful act in entering into 
negotiations for and reaching agreement upon a 
contract for Bergey’s personal services to 
commence after the expiration of his contract with 
the Bengals. . . .  [T]here are no more obligations to 
be protected by either party to the Bengals contract 
after [expiration] . . . . 
. . . . 
This Court recognizes such public interest would 
probably not stand in the way of plaintiff’s 
obtaining injunctive relief if it is able to establish 
that the contractual rights it has with its players 
have been tortiously, I. e. [sic], maliciously 
interfered with (plus irreparable harm and no 
adequate remedy at law).  On the facts of this case 
the Court cannot conclude that such interference as 
there may be was due to unfair competition.  On the 
contrary, it seems to the Court that the threatened 
harm is due to competition, and an injunction would 
therefore not be in the public interest. 
. . . . 
It is not the players’ present services for which the 
clubs will have to pay more, for those are protected 
by contracts which can presumably be enforced in 
the usual manner.  It is only when the NFL chooses 
(and such decision is likely) to join the competition 
for the later services of its players that it will incur 
these higher costs.  In our best judgment, such 
higher costs will be attributable to competition and 
not unfair competition.308 
 
 308 Id. at 144, 147–48 (citations omitted).  For holdings consistent with the holding in 
Bergey, see Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, 457 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1972); Wash. 
Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969); Minn. Muskies v. 
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In World Football League v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, 
Inc.,309 referenced in Bergey, the court considered the harmful 
effect on competition if players were unable to freely bargain with 
other clubs for their services to commence after the expiration of 
their current contracts: 
We must consider the freedom of contract of the 
individual players as well as the rights of the Club 
under its present contracts.  Bargaining for future 
services is a matter of economics.  The Club can 
assure itself of the continued services and loyalty of 
its players by offering them long-term contracts and 
other financial inducements.  If it chooses not to do 
so for economic reasons, it has no legal ground to 
complain if the players look elsewhere for their 
future careers and enter into contracts for services to 
be performed when their present contracts with the 
Club expire.310 
While the same effect on competition would certainly be 
applicable to a coach seeking to leave for another school after the 
expiration of his contract, there is no interest of the coach or the 
other school worthy of protection whatsoever when the coach 
instead wants to breach his existing contract by accepting a new 
position before the expiration of his existing contract.311  The most 
that could be said is that the coach is not able to freely work for the 
 
Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1969); World Football League v. Dallas Cowboys 
Football Club, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). 
 309 513 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). 
 310 Id. at 105. 
 311 Ne. Univ. v. Brown, No. 20040827F, 2004 WL 616225, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 11, 2004) (finding that the harm to Brown because he would not be able to be the 
football coach at U. Mass. and the harm to U. Mass because it would not be able to 
employ Brown as its football coach was outweighed by the irreparable harm suffered by 
Northeastern). 
The breach of contract by Brown was and is obvious, brazen, and 
defiant. U. Mass., as the Commonwealth’s premier higher 
educational institution was and is so callous in its duty to provide 
ethical and moral values for its students. The persons from U. Mass. 
involved in this episode have clearly violated the law but above all 
else have brought great shame on themselves and the university. 
Id. 
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employer of his choice if the injunction is granted.  However, there 
is nothing inherently unreasonable or unduly harsh about a coach 
not being able to work for his school of choice, which is not the 
equivalent of being denied the opportunity to freely market his 
services.  To the contrary, the coach was provided the opportunity 
to freely market his services to the fullest extent when he agreed, 
with the assistance of counsel, to a long-term employment contract 
in return for a very high level of guaranteed compensation.  In that 
contract, the coach expressly agreed (and if not expressly, then 
implicitly) to provide his services exclusively to the contracting 
school.  This negative covenant should be deemed reasonable 
because the restriction only exists for the contracted period.312 
The frequency at which schools terminate unsuccessful 
coaches (oftentimes mid-season) creates a notion that schools 
should in turn expect coaches to leave for more prestigious 
institutions when they are successful.313  This thought process is 
flawed because when the school terminates the coach without 
cause for not winning, the coach fully expects, and does receive, 
the guaranteed compensation owing through the remainder of the 
contract term.  To permit a coach to walk away from his 
employment is tantamount to transforming a long-term 
employment agreement into a one-sided at-will employment 
arrangement such that, although the school may not terminate the 
coach at will, the coach may leave at will and be relieved of the 
coach’s long-term commitment that both sides understood was to 
provide stability to the program and was the “essence” of the 
agreement.314  Thus, balancing the harms between the school and 
coach weighs in favor of the school because if the injunction is 
denied, the coach receives a windfall and the school is harmed by 
the loss of stability to the program as well as the substantial 
 
 312 See LAW OF PROFESSIONAL & AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 258, § 10:19 
(“[R]easonableness issues relating to negative covenants are not frequently litigated in 
the context of major team sports (primarily because the restriction usually exists only for 
the contracted period).”). 
 313 See supra text accompanying notes 105–13 (discussing dismissal of four  
“unsuccessful” coaches). 
 314 Indeed, the lost stability when the coach breaches the employment contract provides 
the basis for enforcing liquidated damages clauses. See Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 
F.3d 751, 756 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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economic investment it made in the coach.  Moreover, the 
competitor school is unjustly enriched and obtains an unfair 
competitive advantage if it is permitted to interfere with a school’s 
contractual rights with its coach and take from that school the 
intangible value and goodwill associated with program stability 
and success that was created by the school’s substantial economic 
investment in that coach.  Indeed, the courts in New England 
Patriots and Northeastern University expressed concern over the 
unfair competitive advantage obtained by the interfering school.315 
The head coach’s influence in maintaining stability to the team 
is perhaps more of an issue at the collegiate level (than the 
professional level), where the head coach plays a critical role in the 
recruitment of student-athletes and the recruits seek assurance that 
the coach is going to be around for at least the next few years.316  
Therefore, one could argue that the unfair competition advantage 
obtained by the interfering school is greater at the collegiate level 
than the professional level.  But ironically, the NFL, unlike the 
NCAA, prohibits interfering with its extensive “no-tampering” rule 
that restricts clubs from speaking about their vacancies with any 
coach who is already under contract with another club.317  The 
absence of a “no-tampering” rule only highlights the absurdity of 
the situation at the collegiate level whereby NCAA member 
institutions are handing out salary raises to their coaches in order 
to keep them from being poached.318  In June of 2009, Oklahoma 
extended the contract of its football coach Bob Stoops, who was at 
the time already among the top paid football coaches, and the 
contract extension added a “stay” bonus of $800,000 if Stoops is 
still employed by Oklahoma on January 1, 2011, which is in 
 
 315 See New Eng. Patriots Football Club v. Univ. of Colo., 592 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 
1979); Ne. Univ. v. Brown, No. 20040827F, 2004 WL 616225 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 
2004). 
 316 See Katherine Sulentic, Running Backs, Recruiting and Remedies: College Football 
Coaches, Recruits and the Torts of Negligent and Fraudulent Misrepresentations, 14 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 127, 140 (2009) (“A coach is often the most influential 
reason for a recruit choosing a school.”). 
 317 Lattinville & Boland, supra note 188, at 132. 
 318 See Limón, supra note 104 (“Alabama is one of many schools locked in an 
expensive arms race, raising coaching salaries at a blistering pace and putting a strain on 
other schools trying to woo and retain top talent.”). 
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addition to his yearly $700,000 bonus.319  When the extension was 
announced, Oklahoma University President David Boren said that, 
while he thinks salaries are too high nationwide, “we can’t control 
the national marketplace.”320  But in reality, what Boren is saying 
is that they cannot keep competitors from tampering with their 
coach, which was the real motivator for Oklahoma to increase the 
stay bonus, which would also be paid in July in future years rather 
than in October.321  Oklahoma Athletic Director Joe Castiglione 
even indicated that the payment date for the stay bonus was 
intentionally set after the hiring season when coaches are poached: 
“We’re just annualizing what coach Stoops received in the stay 
bonus by waiting multiple years. . . .  We annualized that amount 
so it triggers at a certain time of year following what we would call 
the hiring periods—not just collegiate hiring, but the NFL hiring 
periods.”322 
 The NFL’s no-tampering policy provides that, during the 
playing season a head coach may not seek or accept other 
employment unless he is terminated, and during the off-season a 
head coach under contract is still prohibited from seeking or 
accepting employment unless “(1) he is dismissed; (2) his club has 
granted him permission to explore other employment 
opportunities; or (3) his club has granted another club the 
opportunity to contact him.”323  The NFL’s no-tampering policy is, 
in essence, an anti-poaching rule that not only prohibits another 
club from negotiating for services to commence before the 
expiration of the coach’s current contract, which would otherwise 
constitute tortious interference with contractual relations and may 
 
 319 Associated Press, New Deals for Stoops, Capel at Oklahoma Laden with Bonuses, 
USA TODAY, June 24, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2009-06-24-
oklahoma-contracts-stoops-capel_N.htm?obref=obnetwork. 
 320 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 321 Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 322 Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).  Castiglione further stated, “When those 
rumors start floating and people start questioning and speculating what might happen or 
whether or not a person is interested . . . they always ask what are we going to do?  I 
usually say, ‘Well, have you ever looked at what we have already done?’” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 323 Lattinville & Boland, supra note 188, at 132 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing and quoting NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, NFL ANTI-TAMPERING POLICY 1 (1999)). 
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provide a basis for injunctive relief,324 but also deters another club 
from negotiating for future services which is clearly not tortious.  
The NFL’s no-tampering policy appears to be effective in 
accomplishing its intended purpose.  A few examples demonstrate 
its effectiveness in preventing and deterring coaches from jumping 
ship. 
After the St. Louis Rams won the Super Bowl following the 
1999 season, Dick Vermeil announced his retirement as head 
coach.325  At that time, Vermeil’s contract with the Rams extended 
through the 2001 season.326  The Rams replaced Vermeil’s 
coaching contract with “a consulting agreement that paid him $2 
million over the following four years and . . . expressly provided 
that Coach Vermeil was ‘terminated’ as the Rams’ head coach.”327  
Approximately one year later, the Rams discovered that Vermeil 
was having discussions with the Kansas City Chiefs to fill their 
head coaching vacancy and filed a tampering claim against the 
Chiefs.328  Despite the fact that the consulting agreement did not 
prohibit Vermeil from seeking a head coaching position with 
another club in 2000 and 2001, former NFL Commissioner Paul 
Tagliabue ruled that “the clear purpose and effect of the [Rams’ 
 
 324 See New Eng. Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. Univ. of Colo., 592 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 
1979) (granting injunction based on tortious interference with contractual relations where 
defendant negotiated and entered contract for services to commence during the term of 
coach’s existing contract with plaintiff); see also Wash. Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. 
Barry, 419 F.2d 472, 477 (9th Cir. 1969) (‘“[N]o actionable wrong is committed by a 
competitor who solicits his competitor’s employees or who hires away one or more of his 
competitor’s employees who are not under contract, so long as the inducement to leave is 
not accompanied by unlawful action.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Diodes, Inc. v. 
Franzen, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 25–26 (1968))); Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Bergey, 453 F. 
Supp. 128, 147 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (“This Court recognizes such public interest would 
probably not stand in the way of plaintiff’s obtaining injunctive relief if it is able to 
establish that the contractual rights it has with its players have been tortiously, I. e. [sic], 
maliciously interfered with . . . .”); World Football League v. Dallas Cowboys Football 
Club, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (denying injunction sought by 
Cowboys against competitor to prevent signings for services following completion of 
contractual obligations to Cowboys because “[s]igning such contract is neither a breach 
of the contract by the players nor a tortious interference by the future employers, and the 
threat to enter into such contracts affords no ground for equitable relief”). 
 325 Lattinville & Boland, supra note 188, at 132. 
 326 Id. 
 327 Id. 
 328 Id. at 132–33. 
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consulting] agreement . . . was that Vermeil would remain retired 
from coaching through the 2001 season” and awarded the Chiefs’ 
second and third round draft picks to the Rams and ordered 
Vermeil to pay back the fees he received from the first year of his 
consulting contract.329 
There have been numerous controversies involving head 
coaches Bill Parcells and Bill Belichick.  In January of 1997, 
Parcells was preparing the New England Patriots for the Super 
Bowl, but his agent was telling the Patriots that Parcells would be 
terminating his contract at the end of that season to accept a head 
coaching position with the New York Jets.330  The Patriots were 
successful in an arbitration whereby Tagliabue interpreted Parcells’s 
contract as “giving him the right to terminate the contract only for 
new positions other than coaching or its equivalent.”331  Thereafter, 
Parcells signed a contract with the Jets to be their head coach 
beginning in 1998 (after the expiration of his contract with the 
Patriots), and for 1997, he would be a paid “consultant.”332  The 
Patriots asserted that the consulting arrangement was merely a 
subterfuge and that the Jets engaged in tampering.333  Tagliabue 
persuaded them to settle the dispute “with Parcells leading the Jets 
immediately, and the Patriots getting four draft picks over the next 
three years.”334 
At the end of the 1999 season, Parcells stepped down as coach 
of the Jets and decided to serve as general manager for the 
remainder of his contract, at which point the Jets immediately 
named its lead assistant coach Bill Belichick as head coach.335  At 
 
 329 Id. at 133 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The Chiefs’ conduct did not 
technically violate the Policy, since Vermeil should have been characterized as a mid-
level club employee (‘other club employee’); he was a consultant, not a coach, and was 
given less responsibility than a club president or general manager, both of whom are 
considered high-level club employees under the Policy. . . .  Notably, Commissioner 
Tagliabue considered the Rams’ intentions in his determination that a violation took 
place.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting former NFL Commissioner Paul 
Tagliabue)). 
 330 PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 131 (3d ed. 2004). 
 331 Id. 
 332 Id. 
 333 Id. 
 334 Id. 
 335 Id. at 131–32. 
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the time, Belichick was performing under a six-year contract that 
permitted him to leave at any time to become a head coach for 
another team but which also provided that if Belichick was still 
with the Jets when Parcells left his position as head coach, 
Belichick would automatically become the head coach for the 
duration of the six-year term.336  Belichick rejected the position the 
very next day because he was interested in head coaching the 
Patriots.337  Belichick claimed that his Jets contract was no longer 
binding on the basis that the owner of the Jets in 1997, when the 
contract was signed, had since passed away.338  However, 
Tagliabue quickly ruled that Belichick’s contract with the Jets was 
still binding and, thus, Belichick had become the Jets head coach 
automatically and all other teams were prohibited from negotiating 
with Belichick without the Jets’ permission.339  Shortly thereafter, 
all three parties—Belichick, the Jets, and the Patriots— entered a 
settlement that permitted him to coach the Patriots and required the 
Patriots to give the Jets their first round pick in the spring 2000 
draft.340 
In January of 2002, the Tampa Bay Buccaneers signed Parcells 
to a multi-year coaching contract, but “[s]hortly thereafter, . . . 
Parcells decided not to coach the team.”341  Approximately one 
year later, Parcells had discussions with the owner of the Dallas 
Cowboys, Jerry Jones, regarding their head coaching vacancy.342  
The general manager of the Buccaneers took the position that clubs 
needed permission from the Buccaneers before meeting with 
Parcells, in compliance with the no-tampering policy.343  Although 
Commissioner Tagliabue acknowledged that the Buccaneers had 
established a “substantial claim” of tampering, he ruled that their 
 
 336 Id. at 131. 
 337 Id. at 132 (“Apparently Belichick did not want to serve as head coach under Parcells 
as general manager, and he was actually interested in returning to Boston as coach of the 
New England Patriots.”). 
 338 Id. (“Thus, he argued that he did not automatically become the Jets’ head coach 
when Parcells resigned, leaving him free to seek other offers to be a head coach, which he 
would have been precluded from doing as the Jets’ head coach.”). 
 339 Id. 
 340 Id. 
 341 Lattinville & Boland, supra note 188, at 133. 
 342 Id. 
 343 Id. 
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only recourse was to seek damages against Parcells individually 
because the NFL could not recognize the Buccaneers’ contract 
with Parcells as it had never been filed with the NFL office.344  The 
Buccaneers elected not to pursue a claim.345 
Lastly, in 1998, Cleveland Browns CEO Carmen Policy was 
asked at a luncheon whether the Browns would be interested in 
hiring head coach Mike Holmgren, who at the time was under 
contract with the Green Bay Packers.346  In his response, Policy 
first said: 
[A]ny comment “would be tampering,” but then 
quipped: “Let’s just say if a head coach who’s out 
there, who has won a Super Bowl, who has been to 
another Super Bowl, who is coaching a team in 
contention for the playoffs this year, who is an 
offensive-minded coach, looking to perhaps move 
when the season’s over, were to be interested” the 
Browns would also be interested.347 
As one scholar summed up the NFL’s ruling on the Packers’ 
tampering claim, “despite the luncheon crowd’s laughter in 
response to Policy’s rather innocuous humor, the NFL got the last 
laugh, issuing a $10,000 fine against the Cleveland Browns.”348 
If the NCAA were to adopt a no-tampering policy similar to 
the NFL, one could state that this policy presents a potential 
antitrust problem on the same basis that regulating coaches’ 
salaries raises an antitrust problem.  For example, when Kentucky 
recently lured basketball coach John Calipari away from Memphis 
and signed him to an eight-year, $31.65 million contract, former 
NCAA President Myles Brand’s response was that “[t]he NCAA is 
legally powerless to control the extravagant salaries being thrown 
at coaches” and “[i]t’s antitrust if [the NCAA] were to try to 
regulate any salaries.”349  Brand was undoubtedly referring to the 
 
 344 Id. at 133–34. 
 345 Id. at 134. 
 346 Id. 
 347 Id. 
 348 Id.  “The [no-tampering policy] specifically states that ‘any public or private 
statement of interest in another club’s employee is a violation.’” Id. 
 349 Wieberg, Huge Buyouts, supra note 102. 
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NCAA’s inability to cap or restrict coaches’ salaries under Law v. 
NCAA,350 the so-called “Restricted-Earnings” case.351  In Law, the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an NCAA rule limiting 
the annual compensation of certain Division I entry-level coaches 
to $16,000 was an illegal restraint on trade under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act.352  The court of appeals found that: 
Nowhere does the NCAA prove that the salary 
restrictions enhance competition, level an uneven 
playing field, or reduce coaching inequities. . . . 
[O]n its face, the REC Rule is not directed towards 
competitive balance nor is the nexus between the 
rule and a compelling need to maintain competitive 
balance sufficiently clear on this record to withstand 
a motion for summary judgment.353 
The antitrust implications of the NCAA’s adoption of a rule 
that would deter multi-million dollar salaried coaches from 
breaching their term employment agreements, but which would 
also fall short of regulating salaries, are beyond the scope of this 
article.354  But needless to say, there are some material differences 
between a no-tampering rule similar to the NFL’s policy that does 
not regulate compensation and the rule that was struck down in 
Law that imposed salary restrictions.  These differences are 
apparent not only on the face of the rule but are also present in 
terms of the nexus between the rule and a compelling need to 
maintain competitive balance.355 
 
 350 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 351 See Limón, supra note 104 (“I don’t see a cap coming on it because we lost that 
battle once before with restricted earning coaches.  I think it’s restraint of trade and we’d 
probably lose again.  I think the market has to somehow take care of it.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stanford Athletic Director Bob Bowlsby)). 
 352 Law, 134 F.3d at 1012. 
 353 Id. at 1024. 
 354 But see WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 330, at 132 (noting that when Tagliabue 
barred Belichick from leaving the Jets for the Patriots, “Belichick and his attorney Jeffrey 
Kessler then unsuccessfully sought an injunction barring enforcement of this 
Commissioner ruling as a ‘restraint of trade’ under the Sherman Antitrust Act”). 
 355 Cf. Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding an NCAA rule 
limiting the number of assistant coaches member institutions could employ at any one 
time).  In distinguishing Hennessey, the court of appeals in Law noted: 
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b) Harm to the Public Interest 
In weighing the harm to the public interest in the context of 
professional players leaving their team, the Bergey court 
acknowledged the existence of a public interest in preserving key 
team members’ loyalty, given that members of the public are 
devoted followers to such team members and that any such loss 
will affect a team’s chances of winning.356  But on balance the 
court found that any public interest in loyalty was outweighed by 
“the policy of the law to encourage free competition in the 
marketplace.”357  However, Bergey can be distinguished in 
numerous respects, most of which relate to the distinction between 
professional and collegiate athletics.358  Moreover, in Bergey, the 
professional players were not breaching their employment 
agreements and were leaving after the expiration of their current 
contracts.359  The public has an interest in parties’ adherence to 
contractual obligations.  As duly noted by the court in 
Northeastern University: 
There should be no doubt that college sports and the 
revenue that they draw are a major business for a 
university.  At times, at some universities, football 
and basketball programs appear to be more 
important than the universities’ duty to educate and 
their duty to instill in college students basic 
 
Hennessey addresses a restriction on the number of assistant coaches 
that a Division I school could employ whereas the REC Rule limits 
salary of a certain category of coaches.  Therefore, the analysis of the 
reasonableness of the restraint in Hennessey, which did not involve a 
naked restriction on price, will not control the analysis of the 
reasonableness of the REC Rule. 
Law, 134 F.3d at 1021. 
 356 Cincinnati Bengals v. Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129, 147 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (“The Court 
would be blind if it did not recognize that there is a public interest of another sort.  This is 
the concern among fans over the actual and prospective loss of key members of a team of 
which they are devoted followers and the effect this may have on that team’s 
‘chances.’”). 
 357 Id. 
 358 See infra notes 368 and 373 and accompanying text. 
 359 See Bergey, 453 F. Supp. at 144. 
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concepts of ethical conduct and adherence to legal 
and moral obligations.360 
There are numerous aspects of collegiate sports that separate it 
from professional sports for public interest purposes.  The fan 
loyalty mentioned in Bergey tends to be stronger in collegiate 
sports than in professional sports, much of which can most likely 
be attributed to the relationship fans develop with the coaches.361  
Psychology experts believe that “college coaches have a special 
place in the realm of social identity in sports.”362  Rick Grieve, 
associate professor of psychology at Western Kentucky, says “[i]t 
is very common for people to adopt a team for part of their 
identity.”363  According to Christian End, assistant professor of 
psychology at Xavier University, sports fans do not identify with 
individual players very well due to constant player turnover, but “a 
head coach in a major, successful program is in a different 
category” because “the fan-coach connection is well-established” 
when the coach has held that position for a number of years.364  
End further postulates that “when that coach leaves, there are 
strong feelings of being rejected, jilted by someone with whom 
you have a strong emotional commitment.”365  Loyalty is very 
important among sports fans: “A fan is expected to stay loyal even 
in difficult years.  But fans expect reciprocity from the team.”366  
Therefore, when a coach leaves before the expiration of his 
contract, not only is the coach breaching his contractual 
commitment, but it also constitutes a breach of loyalty.  When 
Rich Rodriguez left West Virginia for Michigan and challenged 
the validity of a $4 million liquidated damages clause in his 
employment agreement with West Virginia, U.S. Senator Jay 
 
 360 Ne. Univ. v. Brown, No. 20040827F, 2004 WL 616225, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 11, 2004). 
 361 Sal Ruibal, State of W.Va. Still Feeling Spurned; Calm Yet to Prevail After  
Departure of Native Son, USA TODAY, Jan. 23, 2008, at 5C, available at  
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/bigeast/2008-01-23-wvu-disgruntled-
fans_N.htm (discussing the reaction from disgruntled fans following the departure of 
West Virginia University football coach Rich Rodriguez). 
 362 Id. (citing Christian End, Assistant Professor of Psychology at Xavier). 
 363 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 364 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 365 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 366 Id. 
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Rockefeller denounced, “I think it’s amoral—not immoral—but 
amoral behavior when you dump your team and take off.  I’m 
furious at Rich.”367 
There is also a public interest in cost containment at public 
educational institutions during an economic recession, especially 
because of recent state funding cuts for many publicly-funded 
universities.368  In regards to the multi-million dollar buyouts paid 
to fired football coaches at the end of the 2008 season, Cornell 
economics professor Robert Frank noted that “[t]he pattern is very 
troubling.  We’re spending a lot of money on things that, in the 
end, aren’t going to make any difference in how well we do as a 
society.”369  Maryland Chancellor Brit Kirwan, who chairs the 
Knight Commission, said,  “When times are flush, I guess maybe 
people look the other way when they see these kinds of numbers.  
But I think it’s going to be increasingly difficult for boards to 
explain . . . in these tough economic times.”370  Robert Zemsky, the 
founding director of the University of Pennsylvania’s Institute for 
Research on Higher Education, recently told the Knight 
Commission in blatant terms: “Since you’ve been in business, 
things have gotten a lot worse. . . .  A set of values is not present to 
hold athletics accountable, so the competitive pressures of the 
market give you what you have.”371  Kirwan analogizes spending 
on coaches’ salaries to the excessive salaries of CEOs: “There was 
such an outrage about what corporate CEOs were making and now 
people are looking at what coaches are making compared to other 
 
 367 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 368 See Mark Schlabach, Programs Struggle to Balance Budget, ESPN.COM, July 13, 
2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/columns/story?columnist=schlabach_mark& 
id=4314195 (“Many athletic departments are struggling to balance their financial books 
after receiving less funding from state legislatures and fewer donations from alumni and 
boosters.”); see also Wieberg, Huge Buyouts, supra note 102 (“Four major football-
playing schools will pay a combined $11.85 million in severance to newly deposed 
coaches, a longstanding practice drawing fresh scrutiny as universities and their athletics 
departments struggle through the nation’s economic decline.”). 
 369 Wieberg, Huge Buyouts, supra note 102 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 370 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 371 Jack Carey, Knight Commission Told Restraint in College Spending Must Start at 
Top, USA TODAY, May 12, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2009-05-12-
knight-commission_N.htm (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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university personnel, and I think there’s the same concern.”372  The 
increasing costs to universities of huge buyouts and salaries as a 
result of the coaching carousel at the end of each season is another 
factor that weighs in favor of issuing an injunction. 
Finally, the tax-exempt status of intercollegiate athletics 
distinguishes it from professional sports, and the public has an 
interest because it is subsidizing the buyouts and salaries that are 
funded by universities with tax-exempt revenue.373  In a letter sent 
to former NCAA President Myles Brand from House Ways and 
Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas on October 2, 2006 
requesting information regarding the tax-exempt purpose of 
intercollegiate athletics, Congressman Thomas asked the following 
questions specifically related to coaches’ salaries: 
From the standpoint of a Federal taxpayer, why 
should the Federal government subsidize the 
athletic activities of educational institutions when 
that subsidy is being used to help pay for escalating 
coaches’ salaries, costly chartered travel, and state-
of-the-art athletic facilities? 
. . . . 
Coaches’ salaries account for one of the biggest 
expenses of Division I-A athletic departments. 
According to reports, more than 35 college coaches 
receive salaries of at least one million dollars per 
year.  Sources of revenue to pay these rising salaries 
include student fees, corporate sponsorships, and 
television deals. Paying coaches excessive 
compensation also makes less revenue available for 
other sports, causes many athletic departments to 
operate at a net loss, and may call into question the 
priorities of educational institutions. 
 
 372 Schlabach, supra note 368 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 373 For an in-depth discussion and analysis of federal tax-exemption laws as they apply 
to the NCAA and to the universities operating Division I football and basketball 
programs, see John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption and College Athletics (Univ. 
of Ill., Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-08, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1336727. 
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a. Several Division I-A schools pay their men’s 
basketball coaches four to five times more than their 
women’s basketball coaches.  What additional 
educational benefit do men’s basketball coaches 
provide beyond that which is provided by women’s 
basketball coaches? 
b. What actions has the NCAA taken to encourage 
its member institutions to curb excessive 
compensation for college coaches? 
c. In 2000, the NCAA repealed a rule requiring all 
athletics-related coaches’ income to be reviewed 
and approved by the university.  Why did the 
NCAA repeal this rule?374 
This is a situation in which the questions themselves provide 
more information than the answers.  So long as intercollegiate 
athletics has the benefit of a tax exemption and until the schools 
themselves make the effort to control their purse strings, the public 
will continue to subsidize coaches’ compensation—one more 
factor for a court to consider in an injunction proceeding weighing 
in favor of granting injunctive relief. 
c) Harm to the Interest of Student-Athletes 
“A head coach can sign a 10-year deal, say he’s found his final 
job, promise recruits they’ll be part of a glorious future at XYZ U 
and then leave before the first year’s [sic] over.”375 
As discussed, the NCAA has not implemented a “no- 
tampering” policy regarding coaches.376  Thus, coaches are 
relatively free to leave with impunity, unless of course the former 
institution enforces a liquidated damages clause in the contract or 
in the absence of such a clause sues for damages or injunctive 
 
 374 For the full text of the letter, see Letter from Bill Thomas, Chairman, House Ways 
and Means Committee to Dr. Myles Brand, President, National Collegiate Athletic 
Conference (Oct. 2, 2006), available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2006-
10-05-congress-ncaa-tax-letter_x.htm. 
 375 Jim Thomas, Coaching Searches Get Thumbs Down, DAILY NEWS, Dec. 20, 2007, at 
C3. 
 376 See supra text accompanying note 318. 
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relief.  However, the same does not hold true for student-athletes.  
The NCAA has a no-tampering policy with regards to student-
athletes that prohibits schools from making any contact whatsoever 
with student-athletes under scholarship with another institution 
without first receiving permission from that institution.377  
Moreover, student-athletes are deterred from transferring to 
another institution because NCAA rules require them to sit out for 
a full academic year if they transfer, unless the former institution 
gives permission.378  This inconsistent treatment of coaches and 
student-athletes under NCAA rules, which is fundamentally unfair 
to student-athletes simply on its face, combined with the impact to 
student-athletes when the head coach leaves the athletic program in 
the lurch, makes the case for injunctive relief all the more 
compelling.379 
In a law review article analyzing head football coach 
responsibility for athlete academic performance and good 
citizenship, one commentator posed the question, “what is the role 
of head coaches in relation to the core business of universities, the 
education of the next generation in preparation for their 
assumption of societal responsibilities[?]”380  The NCAA is 
comprised of academic institutions whose mission and purpose are 
recognized in its constitution and bylaws.  Principles of education 
 
 377 NCAA, 2008–09 NCAA Division I Manual, Bylaw 13.1.1.3 (effective Aug. 1, 
2008), available at  http://www.ncaapublications.com/Uploads/PDF/Division 
_1_Manual_2008-09e9e568a1-c269-4423-9ca5-16d6827c16bc.pdf [hereinafter NCAA 
Division I Manual] (“An athletics staff member or other representative of the institution’s 
athletics interests shall not make contact with the student-athlete of another NCAA or 
NAIA four-year collegiate institution, directly or indirectly, without first obtaining the 
written permission of the first institution’s athletic director (or an athletics administrator 
designated by the athletics director) to do so, regardless of who makes the initial 
contact.”). 
 378 Id. (“If permission is not granted, the second institution shall not encourage the 
transfer and the institution shall not provide athletically related financial assistance to the 
student-athlete until the student-athlete has attended the second institution for one 
academic year.”). 
 379 “Coaches jump from program to program without having to sit out a second; the 
student-athlete who transfers must sit out one season.  Coaches have lucrative side 
contracts and side deals; the N.C.A.A. manual has pages upon pages of rules to ensure 
that athletes do not receive extra benefits.” Rhoden, supra note 206. 
 380 Linda S. Greene, Football Coach Contracts:  What Does the Student-Athlete Have 
To Do With It?, 76 UMKC L. REV. 665, 672 (2008). 
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and amateurism are at the constitution and bylaws’ core, including 
“the provision of ‘intercollegiate athletics programs for student-
athletes . . .[,]’ the adoption of ‘eligibility rules to comply with 
satisfactory standards of scholarship, sportsmanship and 
amateurism . . .[,]’ and the maintenance of a distinction between its 
athletic programs and those of official professional sports 
leagues.”381  Indeed, the NCAA’s Constitution expressly provides, 
“A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate 
athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the 
athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, 
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics 
and professional sports.”382  But as one scholar articulated, in 
reality, there are actually two separate and distinct competing 
education models in intercollegiate athletics: 
Under the prevailing amateur/education model, 
college sports are an avocation, engaged in by 
student-athletes to reap the educational, physical, 
mental, and social benefits presumably derived 
from athletic competition. 
. . . [T]he commercial/education model, recognizes 
the dynamic influence which commercialism exerts 
over intercollegiate athletics. The 
commercial/education model, more closely 
reflective of the modern day economic realities of 
college sports, can thus be contrasted with the 
competing amateur/education model, premised on 
illusory assumptions which fail to acknowledge 
commercialism as the driving force in college 
athletics.383 
As more collegiate athletic programs desperately search for a 
“quick fix” to turn around their athletic programs, big-time 
intercollegiate athletics begins to resemble the professional sports 
model, and thus blurring the line of demarcation between amateur 
 
 381 Id. at 667 (citing NCAA Division I Manual, supra note 377, Bylaws 1.2(a), 1.2(c) 
and 1.3.1). 
 382 NCAA Division I Manual, supra note 377, Bylaw 1.3.1. 
 383 Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting 
Realities, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 269, 270–71 (1994). 
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and professional athletics.  As more college coaches are being fired 
during mid-season, it creates more vacancies to be filled at 
season’s end with coaches under contract at other programs.  
According to renowned basketball commentator Dick Vitale,  
There is no doubt that the administration has a right 
to make a change, but . . . unless a coach has 
violated his contract due to behavior that is not 
representative of the school and has not violated his 
contract morally, he should not be fired based on 
wins and losses during the season.384 
 As Vitale puts it, “[i]t seems that the college game is now 
adopting the NBA mentality,”385 in which six NBA head coaches 
were fired during a 24-day period in 2008 from late November to 
mid-December.386 
Even in the professional context, some in the industry question 
the message that is being sent when teams abruptly fire coaches 
mid-season.  Prominent coaches’ agent Lonnie Cooper, who 
represented all six of the fired NBA head coaches, questioned how 
any of these teams could claim to have improved their prospects: 
“If you’re firing six guys at the beginning of the season, but you’re 
replacing them with an interim coach, what’s the message you’re 
sending right there? . . .  Did you make a change because the 
interim coach is a better coach?  I haven’t figured that one out, that 
 
 384 Dick Vitale, Vitale: NBA Mentality Regarding Coaches Creeping Onto Campus, 
USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 2009,  http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/columnist/ 
vitale/2009-02-16-vitale-column_N.htm (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 385 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 386 See Howard Beck, Easy Come, Easy Go, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2008, at SP1, 
available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/sports/basketball/28agent.html?_r=3 
&pagewanted=1&ref=sports. 
The firings began Nov. 22, when P. J. Carlesimo was dismissed by 
the Oklahoma City Thunder.  Two days later, Eddie Jordan was fired 
by the Washington Wizards.  Sam Mitchell (Toronto) was the next to 
go, then Randy Wittman (Minnesota) and Maurice Cheeks 
(Philadelphia).  The purge continued Dec. 15, with the Sacramento 
Kings firing Reggie Theus. 
Id. 
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logic.”387  In the collegiate context, some college coaches have 
noted the impact that mid-season firings have on student-athletes.  
Some coaches claim that the firings send a hypocritical message to 
the players, as Tennessee coach Bruce Pearl asked, “What kind of 
pressures are you putting them under and what kind of message are 
you sending?”388  Pearl and LSU coach Trent Johnson said that 
mid-season firings are “disturbing.”389  When Georgia fired its 
head basketball coach mid-season in 2009, even interim coach Pete 
Herrmann publicly commented how detrimental it was to the 
program as well as the student-athletes: “It’s not a good day for the 
Georgia program . . . .  We don’t feel that it’s in the best interests 
of the team and the players in preparing for games when a decision 
is made like this, but that’s the prerogative of the administration in 
charge at the time.”390 
The “win at all cost” mentality when it comes to a school’s 
decision to hire or fire a coach may not serve the best interest of 
current players in the athletic program as well as prospective 
players who have signed scholarships in reliance on a particular 
head coach leading the program for the term of his contract.391  
Just one week after John Calipari left Memphis and signed his 
multi-million dollar deal with Kentucky, which made him the 
highest paid basketball coach, he indicated that some players 
needed to be concerned about keeping their scholarships.392  In 
describing the type of player needed for his “high-pressure, up-
tempo style” of play, Calipari said: “It’s not for everybody.  If 
they’re good enough to play here and help us win national titles, I 
want you here . . . .  If they’re not, I’m going to tell them the truth.  
 
 387 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Vitale, supra note 384 (“When you 
evaluate their NBA rosters, you don’t have to go to Harvard to figure out that changing 
coaches is not the answer.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 388 Marlen Garcia, College Basketball Coaches’ Departures “Disturbing,” USA 
TODAY, Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/2009-01-
29-coach-departures_N.htm (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 389 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 390 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 391 See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 206, at D4 (referring to student-athletes under 
scholarship, which is only a one-year commitment, “If your skills fade or the coaching 
situation changes, you might be out.”). 
 392 Id. 
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I’m just going to be honest.”393  There is nothing in that statement 
whatsoever remotely hinting to academics or the best interest of 
the student-athlete.  Former NCAA President Myles Brand, 
speaking in Detroit a few days before the 2009 Final Four, said, 
“You have to ask some very hard questions, whether this is really 
in tune with the academic values, whether we’ve reached a point 
already that these high salaries and packages for coaches has really 
extended beyond what’s expected within the academic 
community.”394 
3. Practical Considerations in Seeking Injunctive Relief 
Schools might be deterred from seeking injunctive relief 
because of the cost and burdens associated with prolonged 
litigation as well as the fact that a relationship has deteriorated and 
the school does not want an unhappy employee.395  These are some 
of the oft-cited reasons by courts of equity in refusing to grant 
affirmative injunctive relief in the nature of specific performance 
to order an individual to perform an employment contract.396  This 
section of the paper will discuss whether these concerns are 
exaggerated.  It will also address whether the existence of a 
liquidated damages provision, as well as the absence of one, 
impacts a school’s ability to obtain a negative injunction. 
a) Liquidated Damages Clauses and the Availability of 
Injunctive Relief 
Liquidated damages clauses in college coaches’ contracts are 
heavily negotiated and represent an amount, measured by the 
parties prospectively at the time the contract is entered into, that 
represents just compensation for the school’s damages should the 
coach resign or terminate before the end of the term.  The fact that 
the parties negotiated and agreed upon a stipulated amount as a 
reasonable estimate of the school’s damages does not suggest or 
imply that irreparable harm is lacking.  In other words, the fact that 
 
 393 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 394 Wieberg, Hard Questions, supra note 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 395 See Greenberg, supra note 5, at 248. 
 396 See supra note 262 and accompanying text; see also Rapp, supra note 260, at 271. 
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money damages are deemed under the law to be an inadequate 
remedy when the coach refuses to perform is not altered by the fact 
that the parties agreed that the remedy for non-performance would 
be a stipulated dollar amount.  Thus, in Northeastern University 
the court concluded that, when injunctive relief is sought, a 
liquidated damages provision is not the exclusive remedy unless 
the contract expressly prohibits injunctive relief.397  However, even 
if the contract does not expressly prohibit such relief, a liquidated 
damages clause implies that the parties contemplated substituting 
the stipulated amount for the injunctive relief remedy.  Contrary to 
the conclusion reached in Northeastern University, the sensible 
and fair result is that a liquidated damages clause should constitute 
the school’s exclusive remedy. 
On the other hand, failure to include a liquidated damages 
clause in the contract does not imply that the parties contemplated 
money damages would be adequate to compensate the school for 
the coach’s non-performance.  Unless the parties expressly agree 
that injunctive relief would be unavailable to the school, the 
absence of a liquidated damages clause should have no bearing 
whatsoever on a school’s ability to obtain a negative injunction.  
Indeed, to the contrary, the coach and school typically expressly 
agree that the school would be irreparably harmed if the coach 
refuses to perform and that injunctive relief is an available remedy 
in the event of such breach.398 
b) Protracted Litigation 
The issuance of a negative injunction typically will not result in 
prolonged litigation for the simple fact that continuing the lawsuit 
is virtually a no-win situation for the coach.  The coach is clearly 
in breach of his contract, and by virtue of the granting of the 
 
 397 Ne. Univ. v. Brown, No. 20040827F, 2004 WL 616225, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 11, 2004) (“It appears to the Court that Article IX does not in any way prohibit 
injunctive relief, and merely deals with financial payments for money losses incurred by 
Brown for leaving the University and breaching the contract.”); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 361 (1981) (“Specific performance or an injunction may be 
granted to enforce a duty even though there is a provision for liquidated damages for 
breach of that duty.”). 
 398 See supra note 314 and accompanying text.. 
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injunction, the court has determined that the school is likely to 
succeed on the merits and that money damages are inadequate to 
compensate the school.  Therefore, once the court orders that the 
coach is prohibited from working for somebody else, the only 
feasible options are that either the coach goes back to work or 
settles, unless of course the coach chooses the highly unlikely 
option of sitting on his hands and not working. 
Settlement is a viable solution after the issuance of an 
injunction and operates as a forced buyout.  Because it is likely 
that the contract omitted a liquidated damages clause (otherwise 
there would be no need for an injunction),399 settlement is akin to 
the parties negotiating a post-breach liquidated damages clause that 
they neglected to do when they entered the contract.  With post-
breach negotiation, not only are the parties in a better position at 
that time to make a more reasonable assessment of the coach’s 
market value than at the time the contract was entered, but it also 
enables all three parties—the coach, the party to which he owes a 
contractual obligation and the third party he wishes to join—to 
fashion an appropriate remedy.400 
For example, in a case factually similar to New England 
Patriots, Michigan State University attempted to hire George 
Perles as its head football coach when he was under contract with 
the Philadelphia Stars of the former United States Football 
League.401  The Stars filed suit against Michigan State and sought 
damages of $1 million, and the parties settled with Michigan State 
paying the Stars $175,000 to hire Perles and protect itself from 
potential legal liability.402  Also, in Northeastern University, all 
three parties reached a settlement in which the University of 
Massachusetts agreed to pay Northeastern University $150,000 in 
 
 399 See supra notes 397–98 and accompanying text. 
 400 See Rapp, supra note 260, at 280 (“After the issuance of a decree, the parties would 
simply bargain for an appropriate ‘side payment’ to settle the matter in the most efficient 
way possible. . . .  [T]he parties will arrive at an equilibrium transaction price that reflects 
how much the player values being free of the injunction and how much the team values 
preventing that player from escaping his contractual obligations.”).  “A negative 
injunction might be sufficient to induce a player, and the team he wishes to join, to 
bargain with the team to which he owes a contractual obligation.” Id. at 271. 
 401 See Greenberg, supra note 5, at 247. 
 402 Id. 
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order to hire its coach, but the parties also agreed that he would be 
precluded from coaching the first three games of the season with 
U. Mass.403  Finally, there are the numerous examples raised in this 
paper of settlements reached in the NFL in the face of the league 
commissioner’s rulings to prevent coaches from jumping ship.404 
c) The “Unhappy Coach” Misnomer 
Some believe that seeking injunctive relief to prevent a coach 
from carrying out his desire to coach someplace else will lead to a 
strained employment relationship with an unhappy coach.  
Presumably, the belief is that a coach faced with an injunction will 
be difficult to deal with and may take his frustration out on the 
team and not use his best efforts to win or engage in fundraising 
activity.  Not only are these concerns based on pure speculation 
(because it is extremely rare for schools to even seek a negative 
injunction), but they also seem to be based on faulty logic.  Indeed, 
the substantial likelihood that a negative injunction decree (or 
threat of seeking one) will lead to settlement, as history suggests, 
should vitiate any unhappy coach concern. 
Commentators have made similar arguments in the context of 
affirmative injunctions that order professional players to perform 
under their existing contracts.405  However, Professor Rapp rejects 
the notion that players faced with an affirmative injunction would 
have an incentive to “dog it,” noting that they would be lowering 
their performance statistics which would prevent them from 
 
 403 See Blaudschuh, supra note 282. 
 404 See supra Part II.C.2.a. 
 405 See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Argument for Self-Help Specific Performance: 
Opportunistic Renegotiation of Player Contracts, 22 CONN. L. REV. 61, 84 (1989) 
(“[Serving players with an injunction can cause] opportunistic behavior by engaging in 
conduct that is euphemistically known as ‘dogging it.’  In other words, he can give less 
than his best efforts on the playing field, and thereby punish the club for its failure to 
acquiesce to his demands, while collecting his full salary as provided by the contract.”); 
Stephen C. Wichmann, Note, Players, Owners, and Contracts in the NFL: Why the Self-
Help Specific Performance Remedy Cannot Escape the Clean Hands Doctrine, 22 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 835, 843 (1999) (noting that the terms of the contract must be 
sufficiently definite to permit a court to craft an appropriate order to enforce contract 
obligations through an affirmative injunction and emphasizing that this poses a problem 
in the athletic employment context, since most standard player contracts require a 
player’s “best efforts,” which is not a sufficiently definite requirement). 
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earning higher salaries in subsequent seasons and “performing 
poorly in a season might permanently affect an athlete’s earning 
trajectory for his relatively short career.”406  Rapp further notes 
that there are behavioral norms and incentives in professional 
sports that may not exist in the typical personal services 
relationship in that “most athletes are highly competitive 
individuals who have, in effect, internalized norms of 
competitiveness . . . [that] might motivate them to try to win even 
if they were upset about their contractual arrangements.”407  
Moreover, courts have rejected the “dogging it” theory asserted by 
teams seeking negative injunctions to prevent a player under 
contract from signing a contract with another team for future 
services to commence after the player’s current contract expires.408 
Coaches are much more analogous to players than the typical 
employee working in corporate America.  Not only do coaches 
satisfy the “unique skills” test as players do,409 but coaches are 
similar to players in that, if confronted with a negative injunction, 
they would have no incentive whatsoever to “dog it” while 
continuing to perform under their existing contracts.  One or two 
mediocre seasons could preclude the coach from obtaining 
performance bonuses and salary raises, and could be detrimental to 
his prospects for future employment.  A coach’s failure to actively 
recruit could severely impact his chances for successful seasons in 
the future.  Finally, a half-hearted effort in carrying out various 
off-field (or off-court) responsibilities, such as fundraising, would 
be harmful to a coach’s reputation and could impede future 
employment opportunities as well. 
 
 406 Rapp, supra note 260, at 272–73. 
 407 Id. at 273. 
 408 See Cincinnati Bengals v. Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129, 136 (S.D. Ohio 1974) 
(rejecting the Bengals’ argument that “future services agreement” would reduce player’s 
effectiveness with the Bengals during his existing contract); World Football League v. 
Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) 
(arguing for the players under existing contract who signed contracts for future services 
with WFL teams “will not use their best efforts for the team under their current contracts, 
the morale of the entire team will suffer, the enthusiasm of the fans will wane, and the 
new employers will reap the benefits of any favorable publicity for outstanding 
performance of the players so signing”). 
 409 See supra notes 289–96 and accompanying text. 
C01_KARCHER_FINAL 12-30-09 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/30/2009  10:30:28 AM 
2009] THE COACHING CAROUSEL 93 
CONCLUSION 
At the hearing on the motions for injunctive relief in the 
Northeastern University case, counsel for the coach attempted to 
justify his client’s jumping ship with an explanation that “everyone 
in collegiate football does this” and “what is the big deal?”410  That 
sentiment is all too prevalent in the college coaching industry.  To 
condone a breach of contract that is “obvious, brazen and defiant” 
(as described by one court)411 violates public policy and does not 
comport with capitalist ideals of fair competition.  The non-
quantifiable harm to the public academic institutions employing 
these coaches, including to the public that funds their 
compensation and the student-athletes that rely on them, far 
outweighs the breaching coach’s desire to maximize compensation 
and justifies court intervention to deter coaches from skirting their 
contractual commitments with virtual impunity.  Academic 
institutions have a responsibility—morally, socially and 
ethically—to make sound economic business decisions, which may 
include enforcement of their coaches contracts through atypical 
legal means. 
 
 
 410 Ne. Univ. v. Brown, No. 20040827F, 2004 WL 616225, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 11, 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 411 Id. at *4. 
